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ABSTRACT
In recent years, many state legislatures have attempted to reform
school finance laws. The goals of such reforms vary among states. The
goal may be to insure that the level of education expenditures of a
school district is independent of the district's property wealth, to
equalize per pupil expenditures across all school districts, or to
insure that all districts spend a minimum amount per pupil. States have
used different types of state grant-in-aid mechanisms, such as matching
grants and block grants, to effect these changes. There is a long
literature on the theory of intergovernmental grants,which suggests
that matching grants have a more stimulative effect on local expenditures
than block grants.
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate, in a systematic
fashion, the response of local school districts to various types of aid
mechanisms. This is accomplished by estimating consistent expenditure
models for six different states which employ a variety of aid mechanisms.
Three of the states--Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey--distribute
the major portion of state aid to education through matching formulae,
while three states--Colorado, Indiana, and Minnesota--use block grants.
The results of this dissertation show that the marginal impact of an
additional dollar of matching aid is no larger than the marginal impact
of an additional dollar of block aid. However, neither matching nor
block grants have much of a stimulative effect on expenditures. In both
cases, the major portion of an additional dollar of aid serves as a
substitute for locally raised revenue. Using simulation techniques, the
expenditure models were employed to estimate the total state costs of
achieving several goals of school finance reform through these aid
mechanisms.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Associate Professor of Economics
and Urban Studies
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Background and Research Questions
For many years, the question of equality in public education in
the United States has been under scrutiny. A major issue discussed
by educators and debated in the courts has been discrimination in terms
of access to educational resources. At the heart of the issue of equal
access to educational resources is the present system of financing public
elementary and secondary education. Historically, a large portion of
total revenue for public education has been raised locally from the
property tax. As shown in Table 1.1, the role of local jurisdictions
in funding public education has decreased during the past 60 years.
During the 1919-20 school year, 83.2 percent of all revenue for public
schools came from local sources (primarily the local property tax),
16.5 percent came from state sources, and .3 percent from federal
sources. By the 1939-40 school year, the role of state government
increased substantially. Revenue from local sources decreased to
68 percent of total revenue while the state and federal contributions
increased to 30.3 percent and 1.8 percent,respectively. By the 1975-76
school year, 47.4 percent of total revenue for public education came
from local sources, 43.9 percent came from state sources, and 8.8 percent
came from federal sources.
Although the role of local jurisdictions in funding public
education has decreased over the past 60 years, as of the 1975-76 school
year, local jurisdictions still accounted for a larger percent of total
- 9 -
Table 1.1
PERCENT OF REVENUE FOR PUBLIC, ELEMENTARY, AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
FROM FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES
1919-20 to 1975-76
Percent of Total Revenue From:
School Year Federal Sources State Sources Local Sources
1919-20 0.3 16.5 83.2
1929-30 0.4 16.9 82.7
1939-40 1.8 30.3 68.0
1941-42 1.4 31.4 67.1
1943-44 1.4 33.0 65.6
1945-46 1.4 34.7 63.9
1947-48 2.8 38.9 58.3
1949-50 2.9 39.8 57.3
1951-52 3.5 38.6 57.8
1953-54 4.5 37.4 58.1
1955-56 4.6 39.5 55.9
1957-58 4.0 39.4 56.6
1959-60 4.4 39.1 56.5
1961-62 4.3 38.7 56.9
1963-64 4.4 39.3 56.3
1965-66 7.9 39.1 53.0
1967-68 8.8 38.5 52.7
1969-70 8.0 39.9 52.1
1971-72 8.9 38.3 52.8
1973-74 8.5 41.4 50.1
1975-76 8.8 43.9 47.4
Source: W. Vance Grant and C. George Lind, Digest of Education
Statistics, 1977-78 (Washington, D.C.: National Center
for Education Statistics, 1978), p. 67.
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revenue than either state or federal sources. This dominance of local
jurisdictions in the financing of public shcools is often cited as one of
the main reasons for unequal access to educational resources. Since the
property tax is the primary source for local revenues, the dominance of
local jurisdictions in funding schools indicates that per pupil education
expenditures are dependent on the property wealth of the jurisdictions.
There are large disparities in the property wealth of local jurisdictions
which result in large differences in the levels of revenues raised locally
to support schools. Consider a wealthy suburban community with a relatively
large property tax base and a small urban community with a small declining
tax base. If each community taxes its residents at the same rate, the
suburban community will reap much greater revenues. The property poor
district may either spend less on education or increase the tax burden on
its residents.
Since 1971, the variation in per pupil education expenditures result-
ing from disparities in the property wealth of local jurisdictions has
become a legal issue in both state and federal courts. Serrano v.
Priest1 is the landmark legal case which served as a model for many of
the school finance cases which followed. In that case, taxpayers and
children from several school districts in Los Angeles County claimed
that "there were substantial disparities among school districts in
California in tax base per pupil, that these disparities resulted in
substantial disparities among school districts in dollar amounts spent
per pupil for public education, and that the educational opportunities
available to children in property poor districts were substantially
1Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rpt.601
(1971)
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inferior to those available for children of wealthier districts."2
The California Supreme Court found that the current system of financing
public education made per pupil expenditures a function of the local
wealth of a school district, and therefore, the state financing scheme
was declared unconstitutional. This decision hinged on the view that
the financing system violated the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution.
Following the Serrano decision, the school finance laws in
five other states--Arizona, Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas, and Wyoming--
were found to be in violation of either their respective state constitu-
tions or the U.S. Constitution.3 The constitutional arguments presented
in these cases either involved the equal protection clause of the
U.S. Constitution or the respective state constitution, as in the
Serrano decision,or the education clause of the state constitution.
In New Jersey, for example, the State Constitution requires that the
State provide "thorough and efficient" public education. In Robinson v.
Cahill,5 the New Jersey school finance law was found to be in violation
of this clause of the New Jersey Constitution. It was successfully
argued that because of the heavy reliance on the local property tax
2Update on State-Wide School Finance Cases, School Finance Project,
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law (February, 1978), p. 2.
3Oliver Oldman and Ferdinand Schoettle, State and Local Taxes and
Finance (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1974), p. 945.
4New Jersey Constitution, Art. VLLL, Sec. 4.1.
5Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972),, aff'd
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
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for revenue to finance public schools, property poor districts in New
6
Jersey were unable to provide adequate public education.
This rapid movement toward court ordered school finance reform
was slowed when the lower court decision in Rodriguez v. San Antonio
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court decision on the grounds that local financing of public
schoools and the inequalities in per pupil expenditures that result
are not a violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court decision was based on the view that the Texas
school finance scheme did not discriminate against any definable
class of "poor" and that education is not a fundamental- right guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution. This decision meant that court mandated
school finance reform would have to depend on the interpretation of
individual state constitutions. Since the Rodriguez decision, school
finance laws in five states--Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
and Washington--have been declared in violation of their respective
state constitutions.9
With this growing concern over the inequalities in educational
opportunities that result from reliance on the local property tax for
6
James R. Knickman and Andrew Reschovsky, "School Finance Reform
in New Jersey: The First Two Years," in llth Annual Report (Trenton,
New Jersey: Economic Policy Council, New Jersey Department of the
Treasury, 1978), p. 1
7San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.ED.2d 16 (1972).
8 Oldman and Schoettle, State and Local Taxes and Finance, pp. 954-968.
9 James R. Knickman and Andrew Reschovsky,"The Implementation of
School Finance Reform,"mimeo, 1978, p. 1.
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a large portion of revenues for public education, many states have begun
to reform school funding laws. The goals of such reforms vary among
states. The goal may be to insure that the level of education expendi-
tures of a school district is independent of the district's wealth
(fiscal neutrality), equalize per pupil expenditures across all
jurisdictions in the state, or insure that all districts spend a
minimum amount per pupil. Fiscal neutrality and total equalization
of per pupil expenditures across school districts may be difficult
to achieve since they may require not only increasing expenditures in
property poor districts but also decreasing expenditures in property
rich districts.
Given the specific goal of finance reform in a particular state,
the state legislature has three ways in which it can attempt to achieve
the goal. The state can increase the percentage of total school
expenditures paid by the state and/or change the method of distributing
state aid or completely take over the financing of public elementary
and secondary education. Complete takeover by the state of the financing
of public education would be an unrealistic option in many states given
the long-standing view that local districts should control public schools.
The effects of increases in state aid or changes in the method of
distributing state aid on the level of education expenditures are unclear.
An increase in state aid to a local district may have a significant
impact on education expenditures or little or no effect on education
expenditures. The district may use the grant to increase education
expenditures or as a substitute for locally raised revenue for education.
- 14 -
In the latter case, the district may use local revenues which in the
absence of state aid would have been used for education to provide
other local services or to reduce local taxes. Thus, increases in
state aid may significantly increase per pupil spending or have
little or no effect on spending depending on the behavioral response
of the local district.
A state legislature may also consider changing the method of
distributing state aid in order to achieve its goal. State aid to
education is usually distributed in the form of block grants or matching
grants. As will be shown in Chapter 2, block grants increase the
income available to a local district for education expenditures. Again,
the effect of the block grant on local spending is unclear. Will the
local district use the grant to increase per pupil expenditures or
as a substitute for locally raised revenue? Under a matching grant,
a local district is reimbursed by the state for some fraction of every
locally raised dollar spent on education. In effect, the matching grant
alters the price of education for the district--an additional dollar
in education expenditures actually costs the district less than a dollar.
As will be shown in Chapter 2, matching grants are thought to have more
of a stimulative effect on local spending than block grants because of
this price effect. The decrease in the price of education resulting
from the matching grant encourages the local district to spend more
on education. With the movement towards school finance reform in
recent years, more states are allocating aid to education through matching
- 15 -
grants because of this expected stimulative impact on spending.
However, the size of the impact on local spending of changes in the
price of education resulting from a matching grant is uncertain.
Does a large decrease in the price of education result in a large or
small increase in per pupil expenditures?
The above discussion indicates that when a state legislature
is considering changes in school finance laws in order to impact per
pupil education expenditures, it is important to understand the response
of local districts to the proposed changes. It is the response of the
local districts which determines the magnitude of the impact of changes
in finance laws on the level of expenditures. The experience in New
Jersey in recent years illustrates this point.
As already discussed, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in
Robinson v. Cahill that the New Jersey school finance law did not
provide children in property poor districts with "thorough and efficient"
education as required by the New Jersey Constitution. It was argued
that property poor districts could not provide adequate education
because the finance scheme relied too heavily on the property wealth of
the local district--large disparities in local property wealth resulted
in large disparities in per pupil education expenditures. The Court
mandated that the Legislature alter the school finance laws so that
every district has the resources to provide "thorough and efficient"
education for its pupils. In response to the Court mandate, the New
Jersey Legislature modified the state aid formula and increased state
aid for education by $400 million. The new legislation took effect
in the 1976-77 school year.
- 16 -
Two recent studies evaluating the impact of the new legislation
during its first two years show that the changes did nothing to narrow
the gap between per pupil expenditures of property poor districts and
property rich districts.10 "In fact, the dollar gap between districts
spending at the low 5th percentile and districts spending at the high
95th percentile widened over the period."ll One explanation for this
rather startling result is that in two years local districts have not
had time to respond to the changes in legislation, and therefore, the
long run implications of the new legislations cannot be measured. If
this is the case, policy makers can wait and reevaluate the program in
a few years to determine the impact of the legislation. Another explana-
tion is that the local districts have responded to the new legislation
and the legislation simply brought about no change in the disparities
in per pupil expenditures among school districts either because of the
distribution of grants-in-aid or because of the nature of the response
of local districts. In this case, the legislature can modify the
finance laws again and wait another several years to determine the
impact of the new changes. This type of time-consuming iterative
procedure is a very inefficient method of achieving desired goals of
school finance reform.
1 0 Margaret E. Goertz, Where Did the $400 Million Go? The Impact
of the New Jersey Public School Education Act of 1975 (Princeton, New
Jersey: Education Policy Research Institute, Education Testing Service,
March, 1978).
Knickman and Reschovsky, "The Implementation of School Finance
Reform."
11
Goertz, Where Did the $400-MiLion Go?, p. 4.
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One alternative to the iterative procedure described above for
achieving the goals of school finance reform is for policy makers to
predict the local response to various changes in finance legislation
under consideration. Such predictions would help legislators choose
those changes which will most likely have the desired effects on
education expenditures. The local response predictions can be made
by statistically modeling the education expenditure decisions of local
jurisdictions. The conventional way of modeling local government
behavior is to assume that local decision makers respond to the demand
of local residents, thus education expenditures per pupil may be
considered some function of the income and wealth of the district and
the price of education for the district. The income component of such
a model would include a measure of the residents income as well as
the various grants in aid for education received by the district. In
this way the specific impact of each type of grant on local spending could
be estimated. If the school finance legislation includes a matching
grant, the price of education resulting from the matching grant would
serve as one component of the price term. Thus, the local response
to changes in the price of education can be estimated. Another component
of the price term would be some measure of the tax burden on local
residents resulting from education expenditures.
The Research Design
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate,in a systematic
fashion, the response of school districts to various types of aid
mechanisms. This will be accomplished by estimating a model of local
- 18 -
school district behavior for a group of carefully selected states which
employ a variety of aid mechanisms. In the literature, there have been
a number of studies which estimate education expenditure models.
However, these studies usually estimate an expenditure model for only
one state and, therefore, only examine the specific aid mechanisms of
the particular state being modeled.12 It is difficult to compare the
results of these individual studies because the specifications of
the expenditure models vary substantially. In this dissertation,
consistent expenditure models are estimated for six states--Colorado,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, and New Jersey--with
each state representing different types of state aid mechanisms.
Three of the states examined in this analysis distribute state aid
through some form of block grants while the other three states use
different types of matching grants to distribute state aid. The
results of each of these models are compared and contrasted to determine
the different impacts of these various aid mechanisms on the level of
expenditures. This comparative analysis may provide useful insights
to policy makers who are trying to determine which aid mechanisms to
use to have specific effects on education expenditures.
12
In fact, three of the major studies of education expenditures
are based on models of just one state--Massachusetts. See:
Martin S. Feldstein, "Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in
Public Education," American Economic Review, Vol. 65 (March, 1975),
pp. 75-89.
W. Norton Grubb and Stephen Michelson, States and Schools
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974).
Helen F. Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity,
and the Composition of the Property Tax Base," National Tax Journal,
Vol.28 (June, 1975), pp. 145-58.
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The analysis of local education expenditure decisions is
presented in the remaining four chapters of this dissertation. In
Chapter 2, the various types of state aid to education are defined
and the expected theoretical impacts of these types of aid on the
level of expenditures are discussed. A brief background on previous
empirical models of the impact of grants on local expenditure decisions
in the literature is then presented with an emphasis on the models of
education expenditures. Finally, the theoretical basis for the
expenditure models estimated in this analysis is presented.
In Chapter 3, a description of the school financing systems
in each of the six states included in this analysis is provided.
This Chapter presents the reasons for choosing the six states and gives
a detailed description of the state aid legislation for each of the
states. This legislative background will specifically define the types
of aid provided by each of the six states. These definitions will
prove particularly useful when comparing and contrasting the results
of the estimated expenditure models for the six states.
The specifications of the expenditure models actually estimated
for the six states are described in Chapter 4. The estimated expenditure
model for each state is then presented. The similarities and differences
in the results for the six states are discussed, with an emphasis on
comparing and contrasting the impacts of the various types of aid on
local expenditures.
Finally, in Chapter 5, the conclusions and policy implications
of this analysis are discussed. To illustrate the usefulness of the
- 20 -
expenditure models estimated in Chapter 4 to policy makers, the models
are used to simulate to what extent the aid mechanisms of a given state
can achieve specific goals of school finance reform. Two forms of
wealth neutrality and three forms of per pupil expenditure equalization
across school districts are considered in the simulations. Simulations
for each of these goals are estimated for one state with a matching
formula and one state with a block grant program. In the case of the
state with the matching formula, the price of education each district
would have to face as a result of the matching formula in order to
achieve the specific goal will be determined in the simulation. By
comparing these estimated prices with the actual prices for the districts,
the amount of aid that the state would have to provide through the
matching grant to achieve the specific goal can be calculated. Similarly,
in the case of the state with the block grant program, the simulation
would indicate how much aid the state would have to allocate to each
district in order to achieve each of the goals. By comparing these
estimates with the actual aid received by the districts, the increase
in aid necessary to achieve the goals can be determined.
Simulations similar to those described above would be of interest
to state policy makers considering methods of impacting the level of
per pupil education expenditures of districts within the state. The
results of these types of simulations indicate whether or not specific
goals can be achieved through the existing aid mechanisms and if so
at what cost to the state.
- 21 -
Chapter 2
DEFINITIONS AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In order to evaluate the response of local school districts
to various types of aid mechanisms, it is important to understand
how each of the aid mechanisms works and the expected impact of these
various types of aid mechanisms on local expenditures. Part of the
extensive literature on fiscal federalism deals with the impacts of
intergovernmental grants-in-aid on the level of expenditures of the
receiving jurisdiction. In this Chapter, the types of state aid to
education will be defined and, drawing from the literature on inter-
governmental grants, the expected impacts of these different types of
aid will be discussed. A brief background on previous models of the
impact of grants on local expenditure decisions in the literature is
then presented with an emphasis on models of local education expendi-
ture decisions. Finally, the theoretical basis for the expenditure
model estimated in this analysis is presented.
Types of State Aid to Education
In order to determine the impact of various types of state aid
on local education expenditures, it is important to understand how
these different types of aid are distributed. There are two basic
types of state aid to local districts: categorical aid and general
aid. Categorical aid refers to state aid which is earmarked for
specific programs such as aid for transportation, special education,
vocational training, etc. Categorical aid is distributed on the basis
of need, usually measured as some function of the number of pupils in
- 22 -
each program. Since categorical programs are not usually fully funded by
the state, these programs do depend to some extent on the ability of the
local district to raise revenue from local property taxes. It is more
difficult for property poor districts to raise the revenues for these
programs than property rich towns. To date, however, there has been
little effort to distribute categorical aid according to a district's
fiscal ability to raise such revenues.1 Attempts to equalize the fiscal
resources available to school districts through allocation of state
aid via various equalization schemes have been reserved to the distribu-
tion of general aid. General aid is allocated to local school districts
for the purpose of assisting districts in funding their education
programs. There is no specific program for which the aid is intended.
There are basically three ways in which general aid is distributed:
flat grants, foundation programs, and district power equalizing programs.
Flat grants distribute a fixed number of dollars for each pupil
or unit of instruction in the state. The grant to each district is
simply the fixed sum (e.g., $200) multiplied by the number of pupils
in the district. Flat grants allocate the same per pupil aid regardless
of the wealth of the district, which means that these grants do nothing
to alleviate the disparities in resources available for education that
result from disparities in the property wealth of school districts. 2
1Allan Odden, John Augenblick, and Phillip Vincent, School Finance
Reform in the States 1976-1977: An Overview of Legislative Actions,
Judicial Decisions and Public Policy Research (Denver, Colorado: Educa-
tion Commission of the States, Report No. F76-F, December, 1976), pp. 19-21.
2Ibid., p. 48.
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Both foundation programs and district power equalizing programs
attempt to equalize resources available for education across local
jurisdictions. A foundation program sets a certain "foundation level"
of per pupil expenditures and a minimum tax rate which each district
must levy. This minimum tax levy is generally referred to as the
required local effort. Under this type of program, state aid covers
the difference between the revenue raised from the minimum tax levy and
the foundation level of per pupil expenditures. A property poor
district will raise less revenue by levying the minimum tax rate than
a wealthier district and, therefore, receives a larger amount of state
aid in order to reach the foundation level. Thus, foundation programs
attempt to narrow the gap between resources available to wealthy districts
and those available to poor districts. The success of the foundation
program in narrowing this gap depends on what the foundation level is
relative to current expenditures. If the foundation level is low
relative to current expenditures, then the foundation program will be
less effective in narrowing the gap between wealthy and poor districts
than if the foundation level was a larger portion of total expenditures.
Both flat grant programs and foundation programs insure a minimum
level of per pupil expenditures for each district in the state.
District power equalizing (DPE) grants are distributed by a
formula which is designed to make total revenue a function of the tax
rate levied by the school district (local effort) rather than the
property wealth of the district. In other words, districts levying
3Ibid., p. 48.
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the same tax rate would raise the same revenue regardless of property
wealth. The general expression of this type of formula is:
EV.
G. = (1 - K-)E. (2.1)1 --- 1EV
where
G. = state DPE grant to district i,
K = constant between 0 and 1,
EV. = per pupil equalized property value of district i,
IEV = average per pupil equalized property value of districts in
the state, and
E = education expenditures (usually from the previous budget
14
year).
The constant K is usually set by the state legislature and may be
interpreted as the local share of education expenditures.5 Grubb and
Michelson show that by distributing state aid via the formula given
in equation (2.1), district expenditures become a function of the tax
rate rather than district property wealth. Assuming expenditures, E.,
are equal to locally raised revenue (t.EV.) and the DPE grant G., then:
11 1
4These expenditures are usually defined to include total local
expenditures and DPE state aid. All other state and federal aid are
usually omitted. See the definition of reimbursable expenditures for
Massachusetts in Chapter 3, p. 57 or prebudget year expenditures for
New Jersey in Chapter 3, p. 67.
5Charles Benson, The Economics of Public-Education,'2nd Ed.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 148
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E. = t.EV. + G.
EV.
E. = t.EV. + (1 - K-)E.
EV.
E. - E + E. K- = t.EV.
1 i igV 11
EV
i. i (2.2)
where
.6
t. = tax rate levied by district i.
The above descriptions of flat grants, foundation programs, and
district power equalizing programs provide the basic structure of how
these programs operate. In practice, however, states use many different
variations of these programs. For example, some states using district
power equalizing programs impose floors and ceilings on the amount of
aid districts can receive or set a level of property wealth per pupil
above which districts are not eligible for aid under the program. As
a result of these floors and ceilings, expenditures and equalized
property wealth may no longer be completely independent, as implied in
equation (2.2). States may use various combinations of the three
programs to distribute general aid. For example, one type of program
is used to distribute the bulk of general aid and a second type of
program may be used to distribute a small portion of the general aid
W. Norton Grubb and Stephen Michelson, States and Schools
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 74-75.
7Examples of specific limitations on the distribution of state
aid are given in Chapter 3, where the specific programs used in the six
states included in this analysis are described in detail.
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funds as supplemental aid. Table 2.1 indicates the percent of total
revenue for public elementary and secondary education from state sources
during the 1975-76 school year by state. The Table also gives the
percentage of total state aid distributed through flat grants, foundation
programs, district power equalizing grants, categorical grants, and
other state support grants. The Table shows that during the 1975-76
school year, 30 states used some variation of the foundation program
to distribute the bulk of general aid, 11 states used a district
power equalizing formula, and 8 states used a flat grant program.
Theoretical Impacts of Aid on Expenditures
The economic theory of intergovernmental grants suggests the
different ways in which the various types of aid already discussed
will impact local expenditure decisions. This theory is largely based
on the model developed by James Wilde.8 This basic model will be
presented firstand then the model will be modified to include the
specific characteristics of the different types of aid for education
already outlined above.
Wilde's model considers the governing body of a local district
which must decide how to allocate the district's resources between a
social good, say education, and all other social and private goods, X.
The model assumes that the district has a set of preferences represented
by those of the governing body and that these preferences are consistent.
Therefore, these preferences are represented by a conventional mapping
8James Wilde, "The Expenditure Effects of Grant-In-Aid Programs,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 21 (September, 1968), pp. 340-48.
- 27
Table 2.1
STATE AID TO LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS BY TYPE OF DISTRIBUTION, 1975-76
Percent of State Aid Distributed Through:
State Aid As A District Power
Percent of Total Flat Foundation Equalizing Categorical Other State
Revenue* Grants Aid Aid Aid Support
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado b
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusettsb
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraskab
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyomingh
62.2
61.9
45.7
51.3
42.4
40.7
32.4
68.3
52.1
47.1
87.2
48.2
39.3
48.5
41.9
39.0
55.5
57.3
43.1
41.0
36.1
45.0
58.5
54.5
37.2
50.9
19.0
37.5
9.5
28.6
59.4
39.3
61.6
43.7
39.5
50.5
26.1
47.2
33.4
54.9
17.0
49.3
49.0
54.6
28.6
32.0
61.1
54.3
36.5
30.9
5.4
0.9
2.8
69.8
27.3
0.1
68.8
61.7
0.8
86.5
94.1
19.0a
49.3
89.4
81.8
47.7
85.0
(c)
8.4 89.1
1.0 96.4
6.1
3.2
1.5
1.7
3.1
3.7
45.9
19.5
1.4
1.3
91.2
7.2
70.9
91.5
15.2
5.4
23.2
0.9
20.7
14.9
0.5
96.8
87.7
92.5
47.4
75.7
80.9
78.3
85.6
34.1
100.0
20.1
92.1
97.9
84.5
27.9
17.6
78.4
89.9
75 .2d
74.3
52.0
72.8
79.4
100.0
74.5
84.8
3.4a
(c)
72.4 21.6
5.5
7.13 0.5
34.5
75.9
81.7
10.5a
42.8
60.8
38.l
79.1
93.5
75.3
86.7
a
This feature is part of the supplemental support program.bl974-75 Distribution.
CIllinois has both foundation and district power equalizing programs which account for 80.4 percent
dof the total state aid.Includes both state and local shares of the Foundation Program.
ePart of the Foundation Program.
*Source: W. Vance Grant and C. George Lind, Digest of Education Statistics 1977-78 (Washington, D.C.
National Center for Education Statistics, 1978), p. 66.
**Source: Esther Tron, Public School Finance Programs, 1975-76 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of School
Systems, Office of Education, 1976), pp. 12-15.
8.1
24.6
3.1
11.1
23.5
15.2
31.3
33.9
9.8
18.2
52.3
1.4
9.8
2.5
2.6
0.1
0.9
13.5
9.7
5.3
18.1
0.1
1.0
25.0
24.1
18.3
22.7
16.0
18.0
2.9
20.0
60.2
32.2
6.5
0.8
8.8
8.3
34.9
31.3
10.1
20.7
6.5
8.5
6.4
4.7
1. 6e
7.1
24.7
16.7
27.2
5.7
12.8
4.4
0.9
1.4
0.2
17.6
10.5
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of indifference curves. Wilde also assumes that the governing body of
a local district maximizes the district's preferences subject to the
prices of the social good, education, and the prices of all other
private and social goods and the total resources available to the
district. In the absence of state and federal aid, a district's
resources consist of the sum of the residents' income after state and
federal income taxes.
Given that the prices of education and all other social and
private goods, X, and the district's resources are known, the district
faces a budget line, BB' (see Figure 2.1). The district will operate
at point A, where the district's indifference curve is tangent to the
budget line BB' allocating $C to education expenditures and $D to X.
Assume that the local district receives a general lump sum or block
grant of $BT from the federal or state government which can be allocated
to any local program. This general block grant increases the total
resources available to the district and, therefore, shifts the budget
constraint from BB' to TT'. This type of grant is said to have an
income effect on local spending. As a result of the grant, the district
now operates at point E allocating $F to education, increasing education
expenditures by $F-C, and allocating $G to X, increasing expenditures
on X by $G-D.
Suppose that rather than receiving a lump sum grant from the
state or federal government, the district receives a grant with matching
provisions. In other words, for every dollar the local district spends
on a particular budget item, such as education, the state or federal
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Figure 2.1
IMPACTS OF GENERAL BLOCK GRANTS
AND UNRESTRICTED MATCHING GRANTS ON EXPENDITURES
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government contributes some fraction of the dollar. In effect, the
matching grant reduces the price of education for the local district.
Assuming there are no restrictions on the matching grant, such a grant
would pivot the budget line from BB' to BR' (see Figure 2.1). The
district will now operate at point H allocating $I to education and
B'R'$J to X. The state or federal government will pay OB, of the local
share of the local district's education expenditures. This type of
matching grant has both an income and a price effect. Matching grants
are thought to have more of a stimulative effect on local expenditures
than lump sum grants because matching grants reduce the price of the
budget item. Economic theory suggests that when the price of a good
falls, more of the good will be purchased.
The different types of aid to education described earlier can
be divided into the block grant and matching grant categories used in
Wilde's model. Flat grants, foundation grants, and categorical grants
are all examples of block grants. The district power equalizing grant
is a matching grant, since the size of the grant is some fraction of
the level of expenditures.
Flat grants, foundation grants, and categorical grants are all
forms of state aid to local education programs. Because these block
grants are allocated specifically for education, the effect of these
grants may be different than that of a general block grant described
above. Again, consider a school district allocating resources between
education and X with an initial budget constraint BB' and an initial
point of equilibrium A. Assume that the state government provides a
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block grant specifically for education, as in the case of the flat,
foundation, or categorical grants. Because of the specific nature of
the grant, it will alter the budget constraint in a different way than
the general block grant discussed earlier. As shown in Figure 2.2,
the specific block grant shifts the budget constraint to BRT' because
the total sum of this specific grant, $BR, must be spent on education.
If the specific block grant is a foundation grant with a required
local effort, the budget constraint would become BUVT'. In this case
the district would be required to raise OU' locally for education in
order to be eligible for a state block grant for education of UV.
For the district modeled in Figure 2.2, in both the cases of
a specific block grant and a foundation grant, the district would
operate at point E allocating $F to education and $G to X. This is
exactly the same allocation achieved when the district received a
general block grant of $BT. This specific grant did not increase
education expenditures any more than the general grant. In the case
of the general grant, $F-C of the additional income was allocated to
education while $G-D was allocated to X. In the case of the specific
grant, all the additional money was allocated to education,but the
district allocated a portion of its local revenue,$G-D, that would have
gone to education in the absence of the specific grant to other uses, X.
This portion of the specific grant served as a substitute for local
revenue raised for education. In other words, the grant is fungible.
As Wilde points out, a specific block grant to education may
have a larger impact on education expenditures than a general block
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Figure 2.2
IMPACTS OF SPECIFIC BLOCK GRANTS ON EXPENDITURES
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grant to the school district, as the size of the grant increases.
Consider a general block grant of $BW. As shown in Figure 2.2, the
grant, BW, shifts the district's budget constraint to WW', and the
district operates at point H, allocating $I to education and $J to X.
Now consider a specific block grant to education of $BW. The district's
budget constraint becomes BSW'. In this case, the district operates
at point S devoting $K to education and $B to good X. The specific
block grant of $BW results in an additional $K-I being spent on education
than with a general block grant of $BW. The specific grant has a
greater impact than the general grant once the size of the grant is
larger than the amount that the district would choose to spend on the
intended program in the absence of the grant. In this instance,
all of the district's own revenue is devoted to X, and the specific
grant serves as full funding for the intended program. When the size
of the specific grant exceeds the amount the district would choose
to spend on the program, the district will operate at the "corner" of
the budget constraint--point S in Figure 2.2. Wilde refers to this
additional impact of a specific grant as a "deflective effect." He
states in his article that "the existence of any deflective effect
depends on the marginal propensity to consume that social good (education)
and on the size of the grant relative to the community's expenditures
in its absence."9
As already stated, flat grants, foundation grants, and categori-
cal grants to education are all examples of specific block grants. The
Ibid., pp. 341-42.
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expected impacts of these grants have been described in detail and
modeled in Figure 2.2. The essential difference among these three
grants is that flat grants and foundation grants are tied to the general
budget category of education, while categorical grants are tied to
specific education programs. Categorical grants would have the same
basic effect as the specific grants modeled in Figure 2.2. However,
these grants may be expected to have a deflective effect more often
than other types of specific grants because the size of the categorical
grant need only exceed local spending on the specific program to which
the grant is tied in order for there to be a deflective effect. In
some instances, categorical grants are given to start local programs
which do not currently exist or to promote programs which have little
local support. In these cases, the categorical grants will most probably
exceed local spending and, therefore, have a deflective effect. In
terms of the model presented in Figure 2.2, categorical grants which
exceed local spending on the intended program will push the district
to operate on the corner of its new budget constraint (point S in
Figure 2.2). Because categorical grants may be expected to exceed
local spending on the intended programs more often than flat grants
or foundation grants exceed local spending on education in general,
categorical grants should have a greater impact on education expenditures
than flat or foundation grants.
The district power equalization grants for education are some-
what more complex in practice than the simple open-ended matching
grant depicted in Figure 2.1. In the simple case, the matching grant
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decreases the price of education and, therefore, pivots the budget
constraint decreasing its slope. In practice, however, matching grants
usually have floors and/or ceilings. In other words, there are minimum
and/or maximum levels of expenditures for which a district is reimbursed
by the matching grant. Districts spending above or below these minimum
or maximum levels receive block grants. Figure 2.3 illustrates the
district's budget constraints, given different restrictions on the
matching grant. In the absence of a grant, the budget constraint is
BB', and the district operates at point A spending $C on education and
$D on X. If the state provides a matching grant with no restrictions,
the budget constraint is BR', and the district operates at H, spending
$I on education and $J on X. Suppose the matching grant has a maximum,
S', such that if the district spends more than $S', the district
receives a block grant rather than a matching grant. In this case, the
budget constraint becomes BST', and the district operates at E, spending
$F on education and $G on X. Note that this restricted matching grant
has less of a stimulative effect on education expenditures than the
unrestricted grant. Consider a matching grant with a minimum, $V', such
that if the district spends less than $V', the district receives a
block grant, BW. The budget constraint becomes BWVR'. Given the
indifference curves for the district in Figure 2.3, the minimum has
no impact on the allocation of resources between education and X. The
district will operate at point H, as it would if there were no restrictions
on the grant. The state may provide a matching grant with both minimum
and maximum spending restrictions, as shown in Figure 2.3. If the
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Figure 2.3
IMPACTS OF RESTRICTED MATCHING GRANTS ON EXPENDITURES
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minimum is $V' and the maximum is $S', then the budget constraint
becomes BWVST'. The district modeled in Figure 2.3 would operate at
point E, as it would if there were only the maximum spending restriction
$S'.
As the above analysis indicates, restrictions on matching grants
may significantly decrease the price effect of the matching grant, and,
therefore, the impact of the grant on the level of education expenditures
may be less than expected when there are no restrictions. For districts
spending above or below the restrictions, the price of a dollar of
education is 1,and the grant becomes a specific block grant having
only an income effect. For districts spending within the maximum
or minimum limits, the price of a dollar of education may be calculated
from the general DPE formula given in equation 2.1. The
price is defined to be that portion of a dollar spent on education
that is paid by the local district or:
T.
i T. + G.
1 1
(2.3)
where
P. = price for district i,
T = contribution of district i, and
G = DPE grant to district i.
From the DPE formula, the matching rate which
grant per dollar of local revenue may be calculated.
that E. is equal to locally raised revenue, T., plus
equation 24 becomes:
is defined as the
Again, assuming
the DPE grant, G.,
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EV.
G. = (1 - K-) (T . + G.) (2.4)
1 E- 1 1EV
The matching rate is determined by solving equation (2.4) for G..
EV. EV.
G. - G. + G.K-= T. - T. K--
EV E
EV. EV.
-i K-- i T K---
EV EV
EVG-l 1)T. (2.5)i K EV. i1
K EV. 1 is the matching rate which indicates the portion of local
1
spending that the district receives in state aid. From equation (2.5),
G.
it is obvious that the matching rate, M, is equal to -. Given the
matching rate, the definition of price given in equation (2.3) may be
rewritten as P = M +. Substitutin KEV. 1 for M., then:
EV. 10
P. K 1 (2.6)
1- EV
Note that as the per pupil equalized property value of the district
(EV.) increases, the effective price (P ) of education increases.
Property poor school districts face a lower price for education than
property rich districts.
1 0Andrew Reschovsky, Predicting the Effect of New Jersey's New
Education Funding Law on Local Support for Education (New Jersey: Urban
Education Observatory, New Jersey Department of Education, January, 1977)
pp. 11-12.
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Previous Models of the Impacts of Grants
On Local Expenditure Decisionsll
There is a long economic literature on the determinants of local
expenditures. The central theme of this work is the measurement of
the impacts of grants-in-aid from both the state and federal governments
on local expenditure decisions. Typically, these studies involve the
estimation of an econometric model with local expenditures being some
function of the income of the local jurisdiction, aid from state and
federal sources, and various socio-economic characteristics of the
jurisdiction. The exact specification, as well as the underlying
theoretical basis for these models,vary widely. In many of the early
studies, there was really no theoretical basis for the empirical models
of local expenditures. As Inman points out, "the model specifications. . .
were rarely more than an ad hoc collection of variables which seemed
to work."12 Because of the lack of a theoretical framework, it is
often difficult to interpret the results of these studies. However,
this early work did show that grants from state and federal governments
were positively correlated with local expenditures. In the late 1960's,
studies by Gramlich, Henderson, and others helped to construct a
theoretical foundation for empirical models of local expenditures.
11 This section is intended to highlight the strengths and weaknesses
of previous models of local expenditure decisions. For a more extensive
and complete review of this literature, see Robert P. Inman, "The Fiscal
Performance of Local Governments: An Interpretive Review," in Current
Issues in Urban Economics, edited by Peter Mieszkowski and Mahlon
Straszheim (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979),
pp. 270-321.
1 2Ibid., p. 273.
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The theoretical frameworks presented in these individual studies
varied, but one common thread found in most of this work is the notion
that local jurisdictions maximize preferences subject to their budget
constraints. 13
Given that the purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate
the local response to various state aid mechanisms, there are two main
concerns when evaluating previous models of local expenditures in the
literature: the specification of the aid variables and the unit of
analysis of the model (e.g., municipality, school district, count,
state, etc.).
One of the earlier models of local expenditures with a theoretical
base was presented by Henderson. Henderson considers a local governing
body which must decide what portion of the community's resources
should be allocated to public and private goods in order that the
community's welfare is maximized subject to its budget constraint.
Henderson models per capita public expenditures as a function of the
community's per capita income, federal and state aid received by the
community, and the total population of the community. The expenditure
and aid variables in the model include all expenditures by and federal
and state aid to cities, school districts, and special districts
within each county. Henderson estimates this model for two samples:
1 3 Ibid., pp. 272-74.
1 4James M. Henderson, "Local Government Expenditures: A Social
Welfare Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 50
(May, 1968), pp. 156-63.
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a cross section of 100 metropolitan counties in the U.S. and a cross
section of 2,980 non-metropolitan counties.
There are several problems that result from Henderson's
aggregation to the county level. The county government does not make
the spending decisions for city or municipal services, education, or
the services provided by special districts. These decisions are made
by mayors or city councils, school boards, and special district
commissions. By aggregating the spending of all these government
units, the model averages across these local decision making units.
This type of aggregation assumes that there are no differences in the
decision making processes of school boards determining how much to
spend on education, mayors or city councils deciding how much to
spend on police or fire protection, or a special district deciding how
much to spend on sewers. This assumption seems rather heroic given
that factors which must be considered when making budget decisions for
different services vary widely. School boards consider very different
factors than a city council deciding how much to spend on police.1 5
1 5There are many studies which have similar problems with aggregation.
For example, the study by Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Factors
Associated with Var-iations in State and Local Government Spending,"
Journal of Finance, Vol. 21 (September, 1966), pp. 523-34, includes a
model of current state-per capita expenditures. These expenditures include
all spending by state and local governments. The model was estimated for
a sample of states.
Other studies which consider expenditures on particular functions
but use aggregate state data rather than data on the actual decision
making unit include: Thomas E. Boercherding and Robert T. Deacon, "The
Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic
Review, Vol. 62 (December, 1972), pp. 891-901; J. W. Osman, "The Dual
Impact of Federal Aid on State and Local Government Expenditures," National
Tax Journal, Vol. 19 (December, 1966), pp. 362-372; Seymour Sacks and
Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures
and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," National Tax Journal, Vol. 17 (March
1964), pp. 75-85,
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Because of these differences in decision making processes, it seems
more reasonable to model expenditures on a specific function, such
as education, with the unit of observation being the local jurisdiction
which controls the spending on that function, such as the school
district.
Another problem with a model such as Henderson's is the
specification of the aid variable. Henderson considers total state
and federal aid to all services within the county. As shown in the
previous section, aid, particularly state aid, is distributed in many
different ways. General block grants may have less of an income effect
than specific block grants, while matching grants have both income and
price effects. The coefficient on this total aid variable indicates
the impact of an across-the-board, say 1 percent, increase in all aid
programs. Since policy makers rarely consider such across-the-board
increases in all aid programs, this aid specification is not very
useful.16 Policy makers consider adjustments in allocations for
particular aid programs, and, therefore, an aid specification which
measures the spearate income and price effects of these grant programs
would be more useful.1 7
1 6Other studies which use aggregate aid variables include: George A.
Bishop, "Stimulative Versus Substitutive Effects of State School Aid
in New England," National Tax Journal, Vol. 17 (June, 1964), pp. 133-43;
Osman, "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid;" Sacks and Harris, "The Determinants
of State and Local Government Expenditures;" and Bahl and Saunders, "Factors
Associated with Variations in State and Local Government Spending."
1 7Inman, "The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments," p. 274.
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Gramlich and Galperl8 also estimate local government expenditure
equations. Separate equations are estimated for expenditures on
education, public safety, social services, urban support, and general
government. Unlike Henderson's model, Gramlich and Galper's model
specified three categories of aid: matching grants, general block
grants, and categorical block grants. The models estimate the different
price and income effects of these grants. The models are based on a
pooled cross section time series of data for ten large U.S. cities.
The data include annual observations for each city from 1962 to 1970.
One problem with using a cross section of cities is that it is impossible
to measure the specific impacts of the particular state formulae because
the observations come from different states. For example, one city
may be located in a state which has a relatively unrestricted matching
grant while another city may be located in a state which has a very
restricted matching grant. By estimating an equation with both
cities in the sample, the coefficient on matching aid represents an
average of the impacts of those different restrictions. By estimating
an expenditure equation for districts or cities within the same state,
the aid coefficients measure the impacts of specific state formulae.
Estimation of several state equations where the units of observation
are districts or cities within the same state permits a comparison of
different aid formulations such that the impact of different restrictions
on matching or block grants can be determined.
1 8Edward M. Gramlich and Harvey Galper, "State and Local Fiscal
Behavior and Federal Grant Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Vol. 1 (1973), pp. 15-58.
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The above discussion points out the basic characteristics that
a model should have in order to address the questions concerning the
impact of aid on local expenditure decisions under investigation in
this thesis. In summary, the model should have, as a dependent variable,
expenditures on a specific budget item, such as education, and the unit
of observation should be that local jurisdiction which has control over
the spending decisions on that item. The districts included in the
model should be from within the same state in order that the impact
of specific aid mechanisms of the state can be determined. Finally,
aid should be specified in such a way that the price and income effects
of the different types of grants can be determined.
The two prominent studies in the recent literature which meet
the criterion outlined above are those by Ladd and Feldstein.19 Both
of these studies estimate education expenditure models for a sample
of school districts in Massachusetts for the 1970 calendar year.20
Ladd's sample includes the 78 cities and towns in the Boston SMSA, while
Feldstein's sample includes 105 cities and towns in Massachusetts.2 1
1 9Helen F. Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity,
and the Composition of the Property Tax Base," National Tax Journal,
Vol. 28 (June, 1975), pp. 145-58.
Martin S. Feldstein, "Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in
Public Education," American Economic Review, Vol. 65 (March 1975), pp. 75-89.
A third model of education expenditures for school districts in
Massachusetts is presented in Grubb and Michelson, States and Schools.
Similar work has been done for Colorado and Minnesota school districts
in Phillip E. Vincent and E. Kathleen Adams, Fiscal Responses of School
Districts: A Study of Two States--Colorado and Minnesota (Denver:
Education Finance Center, Education Commission of the States, October, 1978).
2 1In Massachusetts, school districts are coterminous with cities
and towns.
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The basic expenditure models estimated in these two studies are very
similar.
Ladd carefully outlines the theoretical basis for her model.
Ladd assumes that each resident of a school district maximizes his
utility subject to his budget constraint and that "the education level
desired by each resident can be expected to vary with each resident's
income or wealth, his share of the cost of public services as determined
by the tax structure, and his preferences for education."22 Ladd
resolves the conflicting demands for education of the district's
residents by assuming majority rule. Thus, the community's demand
for education is equal to the median quantity demanded by the resident
voters.23 Ladd further assumes that the median voter in the community
has the median income. Using this theoretical framework, Ladd estimates
a basic expenditure model:
E = f(Y, WR, RB, LS, SBG, FG, PUP, PRIV, POV, PROF)
where
E = total education expenditures per pupil of district i,
Y = median family income,
2 2Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures," p. 146.
2 3There is a long literature on the median voter model. See
Duncan Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 56 (February, 1948), pp. 23-34; Howard R. Bowan,
"The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 58 (November, 1943), pp. 27-48; and
James L. Barr and Otto A. Davis, "An Elementary Political and Economic
Theory of the Expenditures of Local Governments," Southern Economic
Journal, Vol. 33 (October, 1966), pp. 149-65.
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WR = market value per pupil of residential property,
RB = fraction of the assessed property tax base that is residential,
LS = price calculated from the state matching formula,
SBG = block grants per pupil received by districts above or below
the matching limits,
FG = categorical state and federal grants per pupil,
PUP = public school pupils as a fraction of the population,
POV = fraction of families with income below poverty,
PRIV = private school pupils as a fraction of the population, and
PROF = professional, technical, and kindred workers as a fraction
of the population.
Ladd argues that median family income represents the budget constraint
of the median voter while residential market value serves as a measure
of personal wealth or permanent income of the residents. Both are
expected to have a positive impact on education expenditures.
There are three variables included in the model which account
for state and federal grants to local districts for education. First,
all categorical state grants and federal grants are included in FG.
These block grants are expected to increase the income of the local
jurisdiction and, therefore, have a positive impact on local education
expenditures. Massachusetts also has a matching grant. LS is the
price of education for a given district derived from the state's
matching formula. This local share is considered part of the tax
price of education to local residents because this local share indicates
what portion of total education expenditures comes from locally raised
revenue. Because of the various restrictions on this matching formula,
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some districts face a matching rate of 0, which implies that the price
of education for these districts is equal to 1. All other districts
face a price for education between 0 and 1. The expected impact of
this price term, LS, is negative; as the price of education rises,
the district is expected to spend less on education. Those districts
for which the price of education is equal to 1 receive a block grant
which is included in the model as a separate component, SBG. Again,
this block grant increases the income of the local district and is
expected to have a positive impact on expenditure. Given this specifi-
cation of the aid variables, Ladd estimates the separate price effects
of the matching grant, the income effects of the block grants, and
the income effects of the categorical grants.
The fraction of the assessed property tax base that is residential
serves as a proxy for that portion of the property tax burden which
is perceived to be paid by local residents. This residential share
is considered to be another component of the tax price of education
facing the residents of a district since almost all of the locally
raised revenue for education comes from the local property tax. 2 Again,
this tax price term is expected to have a negative impact on expenditures.
Ladd suggests that pupils per capita, PUP, may serve as a third
price term. The argument is that an increase in PUP may indicate more
24 The use of the residential share of the tax base as part of
the tax price term assumes that local residents do not perceive that
they bear any of the property taxes on commercial and industrial property.
In a more complex version of this model, Ladd employs a more general
form of this tax price component to determine what fraction of the
taxes on commercial and industrial property residents perceive they pay.
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children per family which implies less family income per pupil. In
this case PUP would be expected to have a negative impact on spending.
On the other hand, Ladd suggests that PUP may have a positive impact
on per pupil spending if an increase in PUP indicates that more
families have school aged children. The implication is that if more
families have school aged children, there is more interest in spending
resources on education. Voters with school aged children prefer
more education. Ladd argues that the estimated coefficient on PUP
measures the net effect of these conflicting arguments.
In addition to PUP, PRIV, POV, and PROF are included in the model
to account for preference differences among local districts. The
expected impacts of these taste variables may be unclear. According
to Ladd, private school pupils per capita should have a negative impact
on spending,since those families opting for private schools have little
interest in public school spending. Feldstein offers an alternative
view. Private school pupils per capita may have a positive impact on
public school spending to the extent that private school pupils
receive some part of their elementary or secondary education in public
schools. A child may be sent to private or parochial elementary schools
but then attend a public high school. PRIV may also indicate that the
residents place a high premium on quality education and, therefore,
support public education. Ladd indicates that the fraction of families
with income below poverty is included in the model because POV is
positively correlated with categorical aid and negatively correlated
with RES and the coefficients for these two variables would be biased
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if POV was not included. However, it is unclear as to whether poor
families prefer to spend more or less on public education. Professional
and technical workers per capita, PROF, is included as an indication
of preference for education.
Feldstein's basic expenditure model is very similar to Ladd's.
Feldstein's model considers per pupil education expenditures to be
a function of total property wealth per pupil, median family income,
the price of education to the district resulting from the matching
grant, the block grant per pupil received by districts above and below
the matching limits, state and federal categorical grants per pupil,
fraction of the tax base that is residential, private school pupils
per capita, public school pupils per capita, and a pupil growth rate.
There are three main differences between Feldstein's model and
Ladd's model. Feldstein does not include POV and PROF,which are two
of Ladd's taste variables. Feldstein includes a pupil growth rate in
order to control for lags in the district's spending response. As
Feldstein states, "If there is a reluctance to raise tax rates
quickly, a rapid growth of pupils will temporarily reduce per pupil
spending."25 The third difference between the two models is that
Feldstein considers total property wealth per pupil while Ladd only
considers the market value of residential property per pupil. Ladd's
and Feldstein's respective results are presented in Table 2.2. The
models were estimated using ordinary least squares with a log-log
specification.
2 5Feldstein, "Wealth Neutrality," p. 81.
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Table 2.2
BASIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE MODELSa
Independent
Variablesb
Constant
Y
SBG
FG
LS
RB
Ladd Feldstein
-. 057
(.034)
.239
(2.53)
.459
(2.90)
.030
(1.70)
.102
(3.97)
-. 485
(-1.63)
-. 309
(-2.66)
-. 018
(-.781)
-. 027
(-.257)
.283
(7.45)
.475
(6.99)
.066
(5.08)
.136
(5.04)
-1.00
(-5.41)
-. 118
(-2.74)
-1.112
(-2.84)
.208
(1.49)
.078
(1.65)
.102
(1.52)
-. 336
(-4.42)
.65 .64
a
Dependent variable equals per pupil education expenditures. All
variables are in log form. The estimated coefficients are given
with t-statistics in parentheses.
bVariables are defined on p. 45. GROW is the pupil growth rate.
cLadd uses residential market value per pupil while Feldstein uses
total property value per pupil.
*Source: Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures," p. 151.
**Source: Feldstein, "Wealth Neutrality," p. 82.
PRIV
PUP
POV
PROF
GROW
R
WRe
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The Expenditure Model
The expenditure model estimated for each of the six states
analyzed in this dissertation is very similar to those estimated by
Ladd and Feldstein. As was the case in Ladd's model, the theoretical
basis for the model used in this analysis is essentially the median
voter model, which assumes that the quantity of education demanded
by the community is equal to the quantity demanded by the median voter
in the community. The median voter is also assumed to have the median
income of the community. The demand for education is a function
of income, the cost of education to the voter, and voter preferences
or tastes for education.
The model estimated for the six states included in this analysis
considers per pupil education expenditures to be a function of various
income, wealth, and price variables. The income variables included
in the model are median family income and per pupil state and federal
aid, when this aid is not distributed through a matching formula. As
Ladd suggests, median family income represents the budget constraint
of the median voter. State and federal aid increase the income available
for education in the local district. All three of these variables are
expected to have a positive impact on expenditures.
Ladd includes per pupil residential property wealth in her model.
The argument is that residential wealth serves as a measure of personal
wealth or permanent income. Voters are thought to consider permanent
income,as well as current income,when deciding how much to spend on
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education. There is an alternate view of how voters consider wealth
when making expenditure decisions. Voters may be expected to be
concerned over how the level of expenditures affects the local
property tax rate,given the argument that high property tax rates
tend to depress property values.26 Voters have an interest in main-
taining the value of their property. Since the local property tax
rate is simply expenditures divided by the total property tax base
of the local district, voters may consider the size of the property
tax base (total wealth) when making expenditures decisions. Voters
in a district with a large total tax base per pupil may be willing to
spend more on education than voters in a district with a small total
tax base per pupil because they can spend more at a lower tax rate.
It is unclear as to which of the wealth arguments presented here is
the more theoretically correct. In this analysis, the latter argument
is used; and therefore, total property wealth per pupil is included
in the model.
The expenditure model used in this analysis also has three
price components. Each is expected to have the conventional negative
impact on expenditures. As shown earlier in this Chapter, aid
distributed through a matching formula essentially alters the price
of education to the district. The price of education resulting from
2 6See Wallace E. Oates, "The Effects of Property Taxes and Local
Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitali-
zation and the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 77 (November/December, 1969), pp. 957-971.
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a matching formula for district i may be calculated using the formula
presented in equation (2.6). In those states with matching formulae,
this calculated price is included in the model. The residential
share of the assessed property tax base is a second price term included
in the model. As Ladd suggests, this residential share is a measure
of the property tax burden borne by the district's residents. The
third price term is public school pupils as a fraction of the district's
population. As William Neenan points out, "The higher the density
of the school population, the more expensive education is to local
residents." 2 7 As a result, as PUP increases, per pupil expenditures
would be expected to decrease. However, Ladd's notion that PUP may
reflect preference differences--as PUP increases there may be more
pupils per family, and therefore, more voters may be interested in
devoting resources to education--will be kept in mind when interpreting
the models estimated in Chapter 4.
There are no specific preference or taste variables included
in the model used in this analysis. This is a result of the fact that
there are no clear theoretical arguments as to how to measure preference
differences beyond those measured in the income and price variables.
In the literature, a number of rather ad hoc socioeconomic variables
have been used to measure these underlying taste differences. However,
2 7William B. Neenen, "Fiscal Relations Between State and Local
Governments in Southeastern Michigan," in Financing the Metropality,
edited by Kent Mathewson and William B. Neenen (New York: Praeger
Publishers, forthcoming), p. 39.
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there are really no clear theoretical arguments indicating which of
these variables truly measure underlying taste differences. In many
cases, it is difficult to determine what the expected sign on these
variables should be. For example, some studies have included the percent
of the total district population that is minority or the percent of
the population with professional occupations. Do minorities prefer
more or less education than non-minorities? Do professionals prefer
more or less education than blue collar workers? Since it is unclear
how to measure preference differences beyond those reflected in the
income and price variables, preference variables were excluded from
this analysis.
The exact specifications of the education expenditure models
estimated for the six states included in this analysis are presented
in Chapter 4. In the next Chapter the specific aid mechanisms used
by the states included in this analysis are presented in order to
determine how aid should be specified for each of the models presented
in Chapter 4 and to help to interpret the impacts of these various
aid formulations on the level of education expenditures estimated
by the models presented in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
STATE AID MECHANISMS
Given that the objective of this dissertation is to compare and
contrast the impacts of various types of state aid formulations on the
level of local education expenditures, education expenditure models
were estimated for each of six states. These models are presented in
Chapter 4. The states included in this analysis were chosen because
of the types of state aid schemes they represent, as well as the
availability of data for school districts within the states. The
states chosen include three states--Massachusetts, Michigan, and New
Jersey--which distribute the major portion of general aid through some
type of matching formula and three states--Colorado, Indiana, and
Minnesota--which distribute the major portion of general aid through
various foundation programs. The restrictions on these aid programs
vary widely from state to state. The number of states included in
this analysis was limited to six because collecting data by school
district is a time-consuming and costly process. In many states, the
data required for this research are simply not available by school
districts. The set of states considered for this analysis was limited
to those states where the data were readily available either from
state agencies or various research groups. The six states were chosen
from this set of states.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed description
of the state aid legislation in each of the six states chosen for
this analysis. These descriptions will illustrate how each of the aid
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formulae works with an emphasis on the specific restrictions on the aid
programs. This legislative background will prove to be useful when
interpreting the statistical results presented in Chapter 4.
The States With Matching Formulae
Massachusetts
From 1948 through 1966, Massachusetts used a foundation plan
to distribute general aid to local school districts. In 1966, the
Massachusetts legislature passed new school finance legislation which
changed the method of distributing general aid to a district power
equalizing program.1 This district power equalizing program--Chapter 70
of the Massachusetts Statutes--has been used with some modifications
from year to year to distribute general aid from 1966 until the present
school year. For the 1978-79 school year, the Massachusetts Legislature
again made significant changes in the distribution method. For this
analysis, data for Massachusetts school districts2 were collected
for the 1976-77 school year when 62 percent of total state aid to
local districts was distributed through the Chapter 70 formula. The
Chapter 70 formula in effect for the 1976-77 school year will be
described in detail here.
1Ralph Sanders Levine, "Massachusetts' New Equalization Formula
for Education" (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, unpublished
qualifying paper, 1967), p. 5.
2In Massachusetts, school districts are coterminous with cities
and towns.
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Under the Massachusetts legislation,3 Chapter 70 equalization
aid per pupil is defined as:
EAID. = SAP. (RE. ) (3.1)it it it-1
where
EAIDit Chapter 70 aid to district i for the current year,
SAPit = school aid percentage for district i for the current
year, and
REit-1 reimbursable expenditures per pupil for district i for
the last completed fiscal year.4
The school aid percentage (SAP) for town i is defined as:
SAP. = 1 - .65 i
itEVS A P i t i,1
. 5 ( E V S A V )
where
EVit = equalized property value per pupil in town i for the
current year, and
EVSAV = average equalized value per pupil for all towns in the
State.
3Massachusetts Annotated Statutes, Chapter 70, Sections 1-4, 1978.
4Reimbursable expenditures are defined to be "the total amount
expended by a city or town during a fiscal year for the support of public
schools during said year exclusive of expenditures for transportation,
for food for school food service programs, for programs of vocational
education as provided in Chapter 74, and for capital outlays, after
deducting therefrom any receipts for tuition, receipts from the federal
government, the proceeds of any invested funds, and grants, gifts,
and receipts from any other source, to the extent that such receipts
are applicable to such expenditures, provided, however, that amounts
received by a city or town under this Chapter as school aid shall not
be so deducted." (Massachusetts Annotated Statutes, Chapter 70, Section
2(c)).
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The legislation puts an upper limit on SAP of .75 and a lower limit
EV.
of .15. These limits indicate that for any town where the ratio <.38,
EV. SAV
the SAP is set at .75 and for any town where the ratio it > 1.31, the
EVS~
_fSAV
SAP is set at .15. Substituting the definition of SAP into equation (3.1),
the definition of Chapter 70 aid becomes:
EAID. = 1 - .65 x EVit RE (3.2)
it EV SA)it-1
Reimbursable expenditures are approximately equal to per pupil locally-
raised revenue, Tit- 1, plus the per pupil Chapter 70 aid received during
the previous budget year. Using this definition of reimbursable expendi-
tures, equation (3.2) becomes:
EAID it (1 - .65 x EV it T + EAID
itEV SV it-l it-1
Assuming that T. = T and EAID = EAIDiit-1 it it-1 it:
( EV.
it EVSAV i D)it
Rearranging equation (3.3):
=AID ESAV TEAID.t = ) Tit .65EV.i it*
EVsAV 
- 1 is equal to the matching rate. As shown in Chapter 2, the
.65EV iit
price of education for district i for the current year, P.i, resulting
from the matching grant is:
P = (3.4)it M.it + 1
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where
Mit = matching rate for district i for the current year.
ittIn the Massachusetts case, the price of education for district i., i
is simply:
-1 +
it = ('l)+t
or
EV.
P. = .65 it (3.5)it EV A
Under the Massachusetts legislation, there are minimum and
maximum levels of per pupil reimbursable expenditures. If per pupil
reimbursable expenditures for district i, REit-1 are less than .8
multiplied by the average per pupil reimbursable expenditures for all
districts in the State, RESAV, then REit-1 is set equal to .8(RE SAV).
On the other hand, if REit-1 > 1.1(RE SAV), then REit-1 = 1.l(RESAV )
Districts with reimbursable expenditures above or below these limits
are not reimbursed for a portion of each locally-raised dollar but rather
receive some portion of the fixed sum .8 (RESAV) of 1.l(RESAV). In
other words, for districts above or below these limits, Chapter 70 aid
is a specific block grant rather than a matching grant, and the effective
price of education resulting from the Chapter 70 aid for these districts
is 1. Of the 258 Massachusetts school districts included in this analysis,
79 are above or below the spending limit, while 179 are within the limits.
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As shown in equation (3.1), the actual size of the Chapter 70
grant for all districts, whether above, below, or within the matching
limits, depends on the SAP of the district. For example, a property
rich town with an SAP of .15 and reimbursable expenditures below .8(RESAV
would receive a grant of .15(.8 x RE SAV) or .12(RE SAV). If reimbursable
expenditures for the same town were above 1.1(RE SAV), the town would
receive a grant of .15(1.1 x RESAV) or .1 6 5 (RESAV). Figure 3.1 illustrates
the size of the grant that the district would receive if reimbursable
expenditures are at some point between the two limits. In the Figure,
the size of the grant for the town with SAP equal to .15 when reimbursable
expenditures are below the limit is .1 2 (RESAV), and the size of the
grant when reimbursable expenditures are above the limit is .165(RE SAV
If reimbursable expenditures are within these two limits, the size of
the grant received by the town may be determined by the intersection of
the given level of reimbursable expenditures and the straight line drawn
between the limits. At reimbursable expenditures of RESAV, the size of
the grant is equal to .15(RE SAV). Figure 3.1 also illustrates the grants
received by districts with average levels of per pupil property wealth
as indicated by SAPs of .4 and .5 and the grants received by property
poor districts with an SAP of .75, given the possible levels of reimbursable
expenditures. Note that there is relatively little increase in the
size of the grant given to the wealthy town with a SAP of .15,as
reimbursable expenditures increase when compared with the increase
in the size of the grant given to the poor town with an SAP of .75, as
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Figure 3.1
MASSACHUSETTS CHAPTER 70 MATCHING FORMULA
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reimbursable expenditures increase. For districts within the spending
limits, as the per pupil property wealth declines and the SAP increases,
a larger portion of each dollar of reimbursable expenditures is matched
by the State. The average Chapter 70 grant received by the 258 districts
in the Massachusetts sample was $305 per pupil for the 1976-77 school
year.
Michigan
From 1946 to 1973, Michigan's state aid program for local school
districts was essentially a foundation plan. In 1973, Michigan adopted
the "Bursley School District Equalization Act," which changed the
state aid program from a foundation program to a district power equalizing
program.5 This district power equalizing program has been in effect
since the 1973-74 school year. This analysis uses data for the 1974-75
school year for 174 of the 530 school districts in Michigan. During
the 1974-75 school year, 79 percent of the total state aid to those
174 districts was distributed via the Bursley School District Equalization
Act.
Under the Bursley Act 6, the grant to local districts for the 1974-
75 school year was determined by the formula:
EAID. = (KDW - SEV.)mill. (3.6)
1 1 1
5William B. Neenen, "Fiscal Relations Between State and Local
Governments in Southeastern Michigan," ia~Financing the Metropality,
edited by Kent Mathewson and William B. Neenen (New York: Praeger
Publishers, forthcoming), pp. 20-21.
6Michigan, P.A., 160 of 1973.
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where
EAID. = equalization aid per pupil for district i under the
Bursley Act,
KDW = "Key District Wealth" (level of per pupil property wealth
guaranteed by the State),
.7
SEV. = state equalized property value per pupil for district i, and
mill. = mills levied for the operation of school district i.
If mills are defined as total locally raised revenue per pupil of
district i, T., divided by the equalized property value per pupil of
district i, SEV., then equation (3.6) becomes:
T.
EAID. = (KDW - SEV.) 1
i SEV.
T. T.
=KDW x - - SEV. x
SEV. i SEV.i
KDW
= EV.-l1T (3.7)
Since the matching rate is defined as that portion of local spending
that the district receives in state aid, under the Bursley formula,
the matching rate is SEV - 1). Substituting this matching rate into
1
the price formula given in equation (3.4), the effective price of
education for Michigan school districts as a result of the Bursley Act is:
=1i KDW
SEV.-1+1
7State equalized property values are 50 percent of market values.
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SEV.
(3.8)KDW
The Bursley Act puts two restrictions on this matching grant. First,
any district with an SEV. greater than the "Key District Wealth" receives
no aid under the Bursley Act. In 1974-75, the Key District Wealth
was set at $39,000. Of the 174 Michigan school districts in the sample
used for this analysis, 17 had SEVs in excess of the $39,000 limit and,
therefore, received no equalization aid. For these districts, the price
of education resulting from the Bursley Act is 1. The second restriction
sets a maximum number of mills, millmax, which may be entered in equation
(3.6) to determine a district's grant. If a district levies more than
millmax, the district receives a block grant of:
EAID. = (KDW - SEV.)mill (3.9)
1 1 max
This limit on the number of mills means that districts levying more
than the maximum are not reimbursed for some portion of each locally
raised dollar, as indicated in equation (3.7). Rather, these districts
receive some portion of a fixed level of locally raised revenue. In
8
1974-75, mill = .025. Eighty-two of the 174 districts in the
max
8After 1974-75, the restrictions under the Bursley Act became
more complex. In 1975-76, the Key District Wealth took on two values:
$42,000 for the first 20 mills levied and $38,250 for up to 7 additional
mills. This set the mill limit at 27 mills. In 1977-78, the Bursley
Act had two aid components: (1) a flat grant of $164 per pupil and,
(2) a power equalizing grant. The equalizing grant set the Key District
Wealth at $40,000 and the mill limit at 30 mills. Under this program,
any district which raised more than $1,364 per pupil locally was not
eligible for aid. (William B. Neenen, "Fiscal Relations Between State
and Local Governments in Southeastern Michigan," p. 29.)
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Michigan sample levied in excess of 25 mills and, therefore, received
block grants. For these 82 districts, the matching rate was set to 0,
and the price of education resulting from the Bursley Act is 1.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the per pupil grants received under the
Bursley formula in 1974-75 by districts with particular per pupil state
equalized values (SEV), given all possible mill rates. As shown in the
figure, a relatively wealthy district with an SEV of $36,000 which
levied 25 or more mills received a grant of $75 per pupil. If the same
district levied 20 mills, the district would have received $60 per pupil.
A district with an SEV of $30,000 received a $225 per pupil grant if it
levied 25 or more mills or $180 per pupil if it levied 20 mills. A
property poor district with an SEV of $10,000 per pupil would receive
$725 per pupil if the district levied 25 mills or more. If the district
levied 20 mills, the grant would decrease to $580 per pupil. The average
grant received under the Bursley Act by the 174 Michigan school districts
was $364 per pupil for the 1974-75 school year.
New Jersey
Since 1970 New Jersey has used some form of a district power
equalizing program to distribute state aid to local school districts.
In 1975 the New Jersey Legislature passed P.L. 212, which modified
the state aid formula, but the aid program remained a district power
equalizing program. P.L. 212 was the Legislature's response to the
New Jersey Supreme Court rulingwhich found that because of the program's
reliance on the local property tax, the school finance program failed
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Figure 3.2
MICHIGAN MATCHING FORMULA UNDER THE BURSLEY ACT 1974-75
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to provide each pupil in the State with a "thorough and efficient"
education and, therefore, was in violation of the State Constitution.
In addition to modifying the State formula, P.L. 212 also increased
total State support for public schools by $400 million.9 Since the
New Jersey school district data used in this analysis were for the 1977-
78 school year, the equalizing formula specified in P.L. 212 will be
described here. During the 1977-78 school year, 75 percent of total
state aid to local school districts was distributed through the equalizing
formula. Under P.L. 212, equalization aid per pupil is defined as:
EAID = 1 - NCEB. (3.10)
it 1.35 x EV SAV)EtJ.
where
EAID = state equalization aid per pupil to district i in theit
current year,
EV. = equalized property value per pupil of district i in theit
current year,
EVSAV = average per pupil equalized property value for all towns
in the State, and
10
NCEB it-l= net current expense budget per pupil for the pre-budget year.
9
James R. Knickman and Andrew Reschovsky, "School Finance Reform
in New Jersey: The First Two -Years," in lith Annual Report (New.Jersey:
Economic Policy Council,-New Jersey Department of the Treasury, 1978.)
1 0Net current expense budget is defined as "the balance after
deducting: (1) State support for categorical programs pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act; (2) the transportation amount in the current
expense budget; and (3) all other revenue in the current expense budget
except the amount to be raised by local taxation, equalization State
support, and State support for approved transportation." (New Jersey,
P.L. 212 of 1975, Sec. 3.)
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In the legislation, 1 - 1.35 i is referred to as the support
-135 EVSAV
ratio. As in the case of reimbursable expenditures for Massachusetts,
NCEBit-1 may be considered approximately equal to EAID t-1 plus locally
raised revenue per pupil, Tit-1. Using the definition, equation (3.10)
becomes:
EV.t~
EAID. = 1 _ it (EAIDtl + T~t,1.35 x it- it-
Again, assuming that EAID = EAID. and T. = T :
it-1 it it-1 it
EAID i t 1.35 EV EAIDit + Tit) (3.11)
Rearranging equation (3.11):
EAID 1.35 xEV SAV - 1 T t (3.12)
it EV it )i
1.35 x EV. - 1 is the matching rate, and the price of education for
it
district i resulting from the grant is:
p. =1it 1.35 x EVSAV
EV. -t 1 + 1
EV.it (3.13)
1.35 x EVSAV
In the New Jersey legislation, there are two restrictions on the
equalization grant. P.L. 212 defines a "state support limit" as the
per pupil net current expense budget of the district in the 65th
percentile when all districts in the State are ranked from lowest per
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pupil net current expense budget to highest. If a district's per pupil
net current expense budget exceeds the support limit, S, the district
receives a block grant equal to:
EAID.t = (1 - Eit S (3.14)it 1.35 x EV SV
The second restriction in the legislation states that no district shall
receive a grant less than 10 percent of the support limit. Any district
which, through equations (3.10) or (3.14), would receive less than this
minimum is given a grant of 10 percent of the support limit. The
matching rate for any district receiving equalization aid under either of
the two restrictions is set to 0,and the price of education resulting
from this grant is 1. Of the 287 districts included in this analysis,
141 districts had a price of 1.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the various per pupil equalization grants
received by districts with particular support ratios (SR) given all
levels of net current expense budgets (NCEB). As shown in the Figure,
any district with an SR less than or equal to .1 receives a per pupil
grant of 10 percent of the current support limit, S. A relatively
wealthy district with a SR of .2 receives a grant of .2(S) if the
district's NCEB is greater than or equal to S. If the district's
NCEB is less than or equal to .5(S), then the district receives the
minimum grant of .1(S). A property poor district with a SR of .8
receives a grant of .8(S) if the district's NCEB is greater than or
equal to the support limit. If the district's NCEB is less than or
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Figure 3.3
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equal to .125(S), the district receives the minimum grant of .1(S).
The average equalization grant received by the 287 districts in the
sample used for this analysis was $410 per pupil for the 1977-78 school
year.
The States With Foundation Programs
Colorado
Until 1973, Colorado distributed general state aid through a
modified foundation program. In 1973, the Colorado Legislature passed
a new school finance law which changed the distribution program to a
district power equalizing program. The new finance program went into
effect in 1974.11 In this analysis, the foundation program in effect
prior to 1974 will be evaluated. The data are for 109 Colorado school
12
districts in 1973 , which was the last year of the foundation program.
84 percent of the total state aid allocated to the 109 Colorado
school districts in 1973 was distributed through the foundation program.
In 1973, the Colorado foundation program set a foundation level
of $518 per pupil with a required local property tax levy of 17 mills.1 3
The aid received under this program is simply:
AID = $518 - (.017 x TB.) (3.15)
i11
Phillip E. Vincent and E. Kathleen Adams, Fiscal Responses of School
Districts: A Study of Two States--Colorado and Minnesota (Denver: Education
Finance Center, Education Commission of the States, October, 1978), p. 6.
1 2The Colorado fiscal year is the calendar year.
1 3Session laws of Colorado of 1969, Chapter 299, Sections 1-11.
The $518 foundation level for 1973 was set in the Session Laws of
Colorado of 1972, Chapter 90, Section 1.
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where
AID. = foundation aid per pupil to district i, and
1
TB. = assessed tax base per pupil of district i.
Under the Colorado program, if the 17 mill levy would raise more than
$250 per pupil, then the per pupil amount to be raised by the local
tax levy is set by the legislation. In order for the 17 mill levy to
raise more than $250 per pupil, the per pupil assessed tax base of the
district must be greater than $14,706. If a district can raise more
than $250 per pupil with a 17 mill levy, the district would be required
to raise that $250 per pupil unless that amount could be raised with
a tax levy of less than 14 mills, in which case the district would be
required to raise $280 per pupil. If $280 per pupil could be raised
with less than an 11.5 mill levy, the district would be required to
raise $300 per pupil. If the district can raise $300 per pupil with less
than a 10 mill levy, the district would be required to raise the maximum
of $380 per pupil. In order for a district to raise $380 per pupil
with a 17 mill levy, the per pupil assessed tax base of the district
must be approximately $22,350. The average grant received by the Colorado
school district included in this analysis was $277 per pupil in 1973.
Indiana
Indiana first adopted a foundation program to distribute general
aid in 1949 and since that time has used various forms of a foundation
1 4In Colorado, property is assessed at 30 percent of the market
value.
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program. In 1976, the Indiana foundation program had a foundation
level of $690 per pupil with a required local tax levy of 30 mills.
In 1977, the foundation level was raised to $755 per pupil, while the
required local tax levy remained the same. For the 290 Indiana school
districts included in this analysis, the foundation grant accounted
for 87 percent of total state aid received during the 1976-77 school
year.
The Indiana foundation formula is rather complex. In addition
to the foundation level and the required local effort, the Indiana
formula considers the training and experience of a district's teachers
and the district's needs for handicapped, vocational, and compensatory
programs.15 The aid distributed to a given district in 1976 when the
foundation level was $690 was:
AID. = [($690 x tr. x ADM.) - (0.03 x CAAV.)] +
1 1 11
[.75 x $690 x tr.(hp Add Ct. + vp Add Ct.)] +
[.60 x $690 x tr.(cp Add Ct.)] (3.16)
where
Aid. = State foundation aid to district i,
tr. = teacher ratio for district i for the current year,
ADM. = average daily membership for district i,
CAAV. = current adjusted assessed property value for district i,
Add Ct. = additional count of pupils in special programs in district i
in the current year,
1 5Acts of 1975 Indiana General Assembly, P.L. 343, as amended.
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hp = programs for handicapped children,
vp = vocational education programs, and
cp = compensatory education programs.
The teacher ratio used in the foundation program is calculated by
dividing the district's teacher factor, which is determined on the
basis of the years of experience and training of the teachers in the
district, by a state teacher factor, which is determined on the basis
of the years of experience and training for all teachers in the State.1 6
Average daily membership (ADM) is the pupil count used in the formula.
The actual ADM used to determine the level of aid for the district is
the greater of ADM for the current year or the ADM for the previous
year. The current adjusted assessed property value is simply the
equalized property value of the district. The additional pupil count
is a count of pupils in special programs weighted by type of program.
For example, the weight given for a program for physically handicapped
children is 2.04, while the weight for a program for educable mentally
retarded children is 1.2, and the weight for a vocational program in
home economics is .33. In 1976, each district was guaranteed a minimum
grant under this foundation program of the sum of the district's 1975
16The inclusion of the teacher ratio in the foundation program
adds a matching component to the program. Districts are reimbursed
for hiring more experienced and better trained teachers. This is analogous
to matching grants where districts are reimbursed for some fraction
of each locally raised dollar. In each case, the aid formula provides
incentives for the local district--in Indiana, districts are encouraged
to hire better teacherswhile under a traditional matching formula
districts are encouraged to raise more revenue for education locally.
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grant plus $80 per ADM. The average grant received by the 290 Indiana
districts used in this analysis was $448 per ADM during the 1976-77
school year.
Minnesota
The Minnesota legislature first adopted a foundation program to
distribute general aid to local school districts in 1957. Under this
program, the level of education expenditures was still heavily dependent
on local property tax revenues. Throughout the 1960's, citizen groups
pushed for school finance reform as a way of relieving the property
tax burden. In 1971 the Minnesota Legislature adopted new school finance
legislation. Under this new legislation, general aid was still distributed
through a foundation program, and the actual foundation formula remained
essentially the same. However, the new legislation significantly
increased the role of the State in funding education. For the 1970-71
school year, State aid accounted for 43 percent of total education
expenditures. Under the new program, the State role increased to 70
percent of total expenditures for the 1972-73 school year. The foundation
level increased from $404 per pupil in 1970-71 to $750 per pupil in
1972-73.17 For the 370 Minnesota school districts analyzed in this study,
foundation aid accounted for 72 percent of total state aid received
during the 1975-76 school year.
17 John Ostrem and Douglas Smith, "The State Revenue Requirements
of School Finance Reform," in School Finance Reform: A Legislator's
Handbook, edited by John J. Callahan and William J. Wilken (Washington, D.C.:
National Conference of State Legislatures, February, 1976), pp. 77-80.
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For the 1975-76 school year, the foundation level was set at
$900 per pupil unit,18 and the required local levy was 30 mills. The
foundation aid distributed to district i in 1975-76 9 was:
Aid. $900(PU.) - .030(AAV.) (3.17)
where
Aid. = total foundation aid to district i,
PU. = number of pupil units in district i, and
AAV. = adjusted (equalized) assessed property value of district i.
In 1975-76, not all districts received foundation grants equal to the
grant computed in equation (3.17). Because of the large increase in
state foundation aid resulting from the new 1971 legislation, the law
specified that foundation aid to school districts should be increased
gradually over a six-year period. This "phase-in" aspect of the law
was designed so that districts spending the least on education prior to
the new law did not in one year receive a windfall grant. The law
specified that any district with current expenditures20 greater than the
18
Pupil units are weighted pupil counts where kindergarten,
elementary, and secondary pupils are assigned different weights. In
1971, for example, a kindergarten pupil had a weight of 0.5, an
elementary pupil had a weight of 1.0, and a secondary pupil had a
weight of 1.4. (Ibid., p. 79.)
1 9Minnesota Statutes 1975, Section 124.212.
2 0For the purposes of this aspect of the law, current expenditures
are equal to "state and local current expense for pupils in elementary and
secondary schools, exclusive of transportation, veterans training program,
community services, and after reduction for receipts from the sale of
other items sold to the individual pupil by the school. . .and after
reduction for receipts from quasi-school activities when the school board
has assumed direction and control. . ." (Minnesota Statutes 1971,
Section 124:212 Subd. 2(1)).
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State average in 1970-71 receive the foundation grant determined by the
foundation formula. In 1975-76, these districts received the grant
specified in equation (3.17). Districts with current expenditures below
the State average in 1970-71 receive either the grant determined in
equation (3.17) or the grant calculated from the "formula allowance,"
whichever is less. The "formula allowance" is a calculated foundation
level which is less than the foundation level set for a particular year
(e.g., $900 in 1975-76). A "formula allowance" is calculated for these
districts for each year of the "phase in" period.21 The formula
allowance for a given year is based on the foundation level for that year
and the formula allowance for the previous year. The formula allowance
gets closer to the foundation level each year. In 1975-76, the formula
allowance per pupil was:
$900 - FA t 1
FA. = + FA.(18it 2 it-1 (3.18)
where
FAit = formula allowance per pupil for district i in 1975-76, and
FAit-1 = formula allowance per pupil for district i in 1974-75.
For districts receiving foundation aid under the formula allowance in
1975-76, the local tax levy (mill. ) required is equal to:
it
21 This six-year "phase in" process ended in 1977-78. For the
1977-78 school year, all districts received foundation aid based on the
foundation level of $1,095 per pupil unit and a required local effort
of 28 mills.
The discussion of this "phase in" aspect of the legislation and
the formula allowance is largely based on a telephone conversation with
Mr. Gary Olson of the Minnesota Department of Education.
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mill. FAit (.03) (3.19)
it 900
Obviously, this local levy is less than the 30 mills required in
equation (3.17). The foundation aid received by districts under the
formula allowance is:
Aid. = FA (PU ) - mill. (AVV. ) (3.20)it it it it it
The average grant received under this foundation program by the 370
Minnesota school districts used in this analysis was $650 per pupil
unit during the 1975-76 school year.
The above discussion illustrates the differences in state aid
mechanisms emphasizing the different restrictions placed on the aid
formulae in each of the states. As discussed in Chapter 2, these
restrictions may help determine the impact of a specific grant on
local expenditure decisions. It will be important to recall the
specific aid mechanism and restrictions on these mechanisms for each
of the states when interpreting the results of the expenditure models
presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, the estimated expenditure models
for each of the six states will be presented, and these results will
be compared and contrasted emphasizing the similarities and dissimilarities
in the impacts of the state aid on local expenditure decisions.
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Chapter 4
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND RESULTS
The theoretical basis for the expenditure models estimated in
this analysis was presented in Chapter 2. The purpose of this Chapter
is to discuss the specifications of the expenditure models actually
estimated and to present the results of the estimation. Expenditure
models were estimated for each of the six states included in this
analysis. Each model is based on cross-section data for school
districts in a given state for a given school year.1 In other words,
the unit of observation is the school district. In this Chapter, the
specification of the models for the states with matching formulae
will be presented first followed by the specification of the models
for the states with foundation programs. The estimated models for
each of the states will then be presented.
Specification of the Expenditure Models
States With Matching Formulae
The expenditure models for each of the states with matching
formulae--Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey--are of the general
form:
CEXP. = f(Y., EPV., RES., PRICE., SBG., CAID., FED., PUP.) (4.1)1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 See Appendix B for a description of the specific data used
for the expenditure models for each state.
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where
CEXP. = current education expenditures per pupil for district i,
Y. = median family income of district i,
EPV. = equalized property value per pupil of district i,
RES. = residential fraction of the assessed property tax base
of district i,
PRICE. = price of education for district i resulting from the
matching formula (1/(m. + 1) where m. is the matching rate
for district i),
SBG. = state block grants per pupil to district i (received
only by districts with matching rates of 0),
CAID = state categorical aid per pupil to district i,
FED. = federal aid per pupil to district i, and
PUP. = pupils as a fraction of total population of district i.
As shown in Chapter 2, median family income, state block grants, state
categorical aid, and federal aid are all expected to have positive
income effects on current education expenditures. Of the specific
block grants to education, state categorical grants are expected to have
the lArgest effect on expenditures because they are tied to specific
education programs. Equalized per pupil property wealth is expected
to have a positive wealth effect on the level of per pupil education
expenditures. If the property tax rate remains constant, more local
revenue for education may be raised as the tax base increases. Price
of education resulting from the matching grant and residential share of
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the assessed property tax base are expected to have a negative impact on
spending. Both of these variables alter the price of education for a
school district; as economic theory suggests, an increase in the price
of a good or service results in a decrease in the quantity demanded.
As discussed in Chapter 2, pupils per capita may reflect price
differences among districts and/or taste differences among districts.
As pupils per capita rise, expenditures per pupil may be expected
to fall. On the other hand, an increase in pupils per capita may
indicate that more voters have children and, therefore, are concerned
about education.
The specification of the aid variables in the expenditure model
is a result of the restrictions placed on the matching formulae in
each of the states. As shown in Chapter 3, in each of the three states
there are minimum and/or maximum levels of local spending for which
matching aid is received. Districts spending above or below these
limits receive a block grant rather than a matching grant. For districts
above or below these limits, the price of education resulting from the
matching formula is l,and state block grant per pupil is some positive
amount. For districts within these limits, the price of education is
less than l,and state block grants is equal to 0. Together, PRICE
and SBG account for all general state aid to education.
Without the restrictions on the matching formulae, it would be
impossible to estimate the model given in equation (4.1). As shown in
equations (3.5), (3.8), and (3.13), the price of education resulting
from the matching formulae in each of the three states is the per pupil
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equalized property value divided by some constant. If all districts
were within the spending limits, price would be a linear combination of
the per pupil equalized property value,which indicates that the two
variables would be perfectly correlated and the separate effects of the
variables could not be estimated. In Michigan, the correlation
coefficient between PRICE and EPV is 1 when only districts within the
matching limits are included in the sample. In New Jersey, the correla-
tion is .98,while in Massachusetts the correlation is .72. The relatively
low correlation between PRICE and EPV in Massachusetts,when only districts
within the matching limits are included in the sample, is due to the
additional restrictions that the Massachusetts legislation places on
the school aid percentage (SAP). The legislation places an upper
limit on SAP of .75,which implies that the minimum per pupil equalized
property value is .38 of the State average. The per pupil equalized
property value is assumed to be .38 of the State average for all
districts with EPVs below this level. The lower limit on SAP is .15,
which implies a maximum EPV of 1.31 times the State average. EPV is
assumed to be 1.31 times EVSAV for all districts with EPVs above this
level. These limits account for the relatively low correlation coefficient
in Massachusetts.
2
Recall that the SAP for district i is:
EV.
SAP. = 1 - .65( 1
1 EV
SAV
where
EV. = equalized property value per pupil in town i,and
EVSAV average equalized property value per pupil for all towns
in the State.
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The simple correlation matrices for each of the three states are
presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. These matrices are based on the
total sample--all districts, above, below, and within the matching limits--
used to estimate the expenditure models. All variables in the expendi-
ture models are included in the matrices. Note that the correlation
between PRICE and EPV drops to .463 in Michigan, .407 in Massachusetts,
and .60.1 in New Jersey. These tables also show a relatively high
correlation between PRICE and SBG. This correlation coefficient is
.659 in Michigan, .716 in Massachusetts, and .643 in New Jersey. These
correlations are not surprising given the relationship between PRICE
and SBG defined in the legislation; SBG is some positive amount when
PRICE is equal to 1 and 0 when price is less than 1.
States With Foundation Programs
The only difference between the expenditure models estimated for
the states with foundation programs--Colorado, Indiana, and Minnesota--
and the expenditure models estimated for states with matching formulae
is the specification of the aid variables. As shown in Chapter 2,
foundation grants increase the community's income but do not alter
the price of education. As a result, the per pupil foundation grant
is included in the model in place of PRICE and SBG in the model
presented in equation 4.1. Thus the general form of the expenditure
models for states with foundation programs is:
CEXP. = f(Y., EPV., RES., EAID., CAID., FED., PUP.) (4.2)
i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.1
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MASSACHUSETTS
CEXP Y EPV RES PRICE CAID FED SBG PUP
CEXP 1.000 .436 .523 .010 .274 ..513 .068 -.032 -.382
Y .436 1.000 .081 .379 .208 .159 -.290 -.030 .156
EPV .523 .081 1.000 -.026 .407 .127 -.057 -.045 -.388
RES .010 .379 -.026 1.000 .022 -.026 -.306 .027 .160
PRICE .274 .208 .407 .022 1.000 .078 .002 .716 -.179
CAID .513 .159 .127 -.026 .078 1.000 .082 .087 -.154
FED .068 -.290 -.057 -.306 .002 .082 1.000 .095 -.051
SBG -.032 -.030 -.045 .027 .716 .087 .095 1.000 -.018
PUP -.382 .156 -.388 .160 -.179 -.154 -.051 -.018 1.000
00
Table 4.2
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MICHIGAN
CEXP Y EPV RES PRICE CAID FED SBG PUP
CEXP 1.000 .394 .543 -.001 .616 .239 .380 .239 -.498
Y .394 1.000 .226 .433 .454 -.304 -.372 .234 -.029
EPV .543 .226 1.000 -.235 .463 -.109 .010 -2.95 -.294
RES -.001 .433 -.235 1.000 .083 -.192 -.314 .277 -.053
PRICE .616 .454 .463 .083 1.000 -.054 .033 .659 -.332
CAID .239 -.304 -.109 -.192 -.054 1.000 .499 .024 -.092
FED .380 -.372 .010 -.314 .033 .499 1.000 .057 -.227
SBG .239 .234 -.295 .277 .659 .024 .057 1.000 -.086
PUP -.498 -.029 -.294 -.053 -.332 -.092 -.227 -.086 1.000
I
Table 4.3
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR NEW JERSEY
CEXP Y EPV RES PRICE CAID FED SBG PUP
CEXP 1.000 .339 .539 -. 054 .398 .186 -.032 .339 -.264
Y .339 1.000 .371 .331 .539 -.225 -.412 .293 .066
EPV .539 .371 1.000 -.090 .601 .065 -.234 .225 -.412
RES -.054 .331 -.090 1.000 .110 -.388 -.180 .110 -.082
PRICE .398 .539 .601 .110 1.000 -.183 -.402 .643 -.344
CAID .186 -.225 .065 -.388 -.183 1.000 .297 -.068 .032
FED -.032 -.412 -.234 -.180 -.402 .297 1.000 -.033 .084
SBG .339 .293 .225 .110 .643 -.068 -.033 1.000 -.189
PUP -.264 .066 -.412 -.082 -.344 .032 .084 -.189 1.000
00
01%
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where
EAID. = per pupil equalization aid distributed through the
foundation program to district i, and
all other variables are as defined in equation 4.1.
Since EAID is a block grant which increases the income of the district,
it is expected to have a positive impact on current education expenditures.
The expected impacts of the other variables included in the model are
the same as those described for these variables in the model for states
with matching formulae.
The correlation matrices for each of the three states with
foundation programs are presented in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. All
variables included in the expenditure models are included in these
matrices. Note the high correlation between per pupil equalization
(foundation) aid and per pupil equalized property value. The correlation
is -.756 in Colorado, -.628 in Indiana, and -.853 in Minnesota. These
strong negative correlations are not surprising given the formulae
used to determine foundation aid. As shown in equation (3.17), the
level of foundation received by a school district in Minnesota is
a linear function of the district's equalized property value. The
reason per pupil foundation aid and per pupil equalized property value
are not perfectly correlated is that not all Minnesota school districts
received the aid calculated in equation (3.17). As discussed in
Chapter 3, the Minnesota legislation had a "phase in" clause which was
still in effect in 1976 (the year for which the data used in this
analysis were collected). In 1976, only half the school districts
received foundation aid calculated in equation (3.17).
Table 4.4
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR COLORADO
CEXP Y EPV RES EAID CAID FED PUP
CEXP 1.000 .281 .585 -.209 -.633 .394 .045 -.184
Y .281 1.000 .049 .459 -.100 -.290 .006 .084
EPV .585 .049 1.000 -.286 -.756 .293 -.259 -.188
RES -. 209 .459 -.286 1.000 .215 -.326 .145 .123
EAID -. 633 -. 100 -. 756 .215 1.000 -. 533 .283 .221
CAID .394 -.290 .293 -.326 -.533 1.000 -.105 -.181
FED .045 .006 -.259 .145 .283 -.105 1.000 .038
PUP -.184 .084 -.188 .123 .221 -.181 .038 1.000
0I
00
Table 4.5
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INDIANA
CEXP Y EPV RES EAID CAID FED PUP
CEXP 1.000 .197 .505 .082 -.167 .055 .202 -.370
Y .197 1.000 .045 .518 .046 -.097 -.126 .196
EPV .505 .045 1.000 -.003 -.628 -.187 -.024 -.263
RES .082 .518 -.003 1.000 .106 -.020 -.145 .038
EAID -.167 .046 -.628 .106 1.000 .270 .026 -.044
CAID .055 -.097 -.187 -.020 .270 1.000 .023 .118
FED .202 -.126 -.024 -.145 .026 .023 1.000 -.047
PUP -.370 .196 -.263 .038 -.044 .118 -.047 1.000
p'"",
I
00
CORRELATION
Table 4.6
MATRIX FOR MINNESOTA
CEXP Y EPV RES EAID CAID FED PUP
CEXP 1.000 -.047 .054 .015 -.025 .615 .449 -.0002
Y -.047 1.000 -.116 .737 -.069 -.153 -.484 -.0215
EPV .054 -.116 1.000 -.516 -.853 .269 .083 -.105
RES 4.015 .737 -.516 1.000 .356 -.135 -.401 -.098
EAID -.025 -.069 -.853 .356 1.000 -.237 -.009 .200
CAID .615 -.153 .269 -.135 -.237 1.000 .158 -.059
FED .449 -.484 .083 -.401 -.009 .158 1.000 -.034
PUP -.0002 .021 -.105 -.098 .200 -.059 -.034 1.000
C
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In Colorado, foundation aid in 1973 was a linear function of
the per pupil assessed property tax base, where property is assessed
at approximately 30 percent of market value. However, assessment
practices may vary from district to district, and therefore, the
relationship between assessed property value and equalized property
value may vary. Because of the variation in the relationship between
assessed value and equalized value and the various restrictions placed
on the Colorado foundation program which are discussed in Chapter 3,
foundation aid per pupil and the per pupil equalized property value are
not perfectly correlated.
As shown in equation (3.16), the level of foundation aid received
by school districts in Indiana is a function of the equalized property
value as well as the training and experience of the district's needs
for handicapped, vocational, and compensatory programs. These
additional components explain why the correlation between foundation aid
and equalized property value are somewhat lower for Indiana than for the
other two states.
The high correlations between foundation aid and equalized
property value described above indicate that some caution should be
taken when evaluating the regression results presented in the next section
of this Chapter. When two independent variables are highly correlated,
the estimated coefficients for these variables remain unbiased. However,
such correlations tend to increase the standard error of the estimates
which may result in relatively low t-statistics for these coefficients.
In other words, low t-statistics which would otherwise suggest a
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statistically insignificant relationship, may be due to the correlation
between the two independent variables rather than the relationship
between the independent and dependent variables.
In the literature, expenditure models similar to those described
above have been estimated using either a linear of log-log functional
form. Ladd and Feldstein estimate their models using the log-log
form, while Vincent and Adams present linear and log-log estimates of
their expenditure models.3 Ladd argues that,
Except that the tax price variables (RES and PRICE) are
predicted to appear in multiplicative form, the under-
lying theory does not imply a particular specification.
The choice of the log-log form for estimation is based
in part on the reasonable view that intercommunity
variations in the tax price, the key variable for this
analysis, are likely to have a multiplicative impact on
education demand. That is, they are likely to affect
demand with constant elasticity rather than with constant
marginal impact.4
The log-log functional form implies that as a price variable (with
its expected negative impact) approaches 0, expenditures approach
infinity. In other words, if school districts bear none of the
3
Helen F. Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity,
and the Composition of the Property Tax Base," National Tax Journal,
Vol. 28 (June, 1975), pp. 145-58.
Martin S. Feldstein, "Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in
Public Education," American Economic Review, Vol. 65 (March, 1975),
pp. 75-89.
Phillip E. Vincent and E. Kathleen Adams, -Fiscal Responses
of School Districts: A Study of Two States--Colorado and Minnesota,
(Denver, Colorado: Education-Finance Center, Education Commission
of the States, October, 1978).
4Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures," p. 149.
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costs of education expenditures, these districts would be expected to
radically increase the level of expenditures. This notion is certainly
consistent with economic theory. Similarly, the log-log functional
form seems appropriate for median family income and equalized property
wealth. As median family income or per pupil equalized property value
(with their expected positive impacts) approach 0, education expenditures
approach 0. This relationship seems reasonable given that most local
revenue for education is raised through the local property tax and
those taxes are paid out of current income. If a district has no
income or no property tax base,locally raised revenue would be 0.
Since most aid programs require some local effort, expenditures for
a district with no local revenue would be 0. However, the log-log
specification is not quite appropriate for the state and federal aid
variables included in the model. Again, that specification would imply
that as state or federal aid approaches 0, a district's expenditures
approach 0. A property rich school district may not be eligible for
aid under a particular equalization program and, therefore, receives
no aid, but the district may still spend well above the state average
on education. Expenditures for such a district are determined by the
income and property tax base of the district, as well as the price of
education for the district. This implies that a linear specification
is appropriate for the aid variables. However, this specification is
inappropriate for the income, wealth, and price variables. For example,
the linear specification implies that if the price of education is 0,
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expenditures are determined by the remaining variables in the model.
Theoretically, it is much more appealing to assume that a price of 0
implies a radical increase in expenditures. Thus, neither the log-log
specification nor the linear specification seems theoretically
appropriate.
For this analysis, a hybrid of the log-log and the linear
specifications was used to estimate the six expenditure models described
earlier. Using this hybrid specification, the functional form of the
model for states with matching formulae is:
CEXP = K - Y~l - EPV2 . RES~03 - pUp~04 - PRICE~65 . e'6CAID
e 7SBG e'8FED (4.3)
where
K = a constant, and
all other variables are as defined in equation (4.1).5
According to this functional form, if median family income or per pupil
equalized value are 0, then current expenditures are 0. If the price
components approach 0, then expenditures approach infinity. If per
pupil categorical aid, state block grants, federal aid, or foundation
aid are 0, current expenditures are a function of the remaining
5The functional form of the model for states with foundation
formulae is:
CEXP = K - YWl - EPVS2 - R - eS5EAID , eS6ID
67FED
where
K = a constant, and
all other variables are as defined in equation (4.2).
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variables. The model can be estimated by taking the log of equation
(4.3) and then using ordinary least squares:
log CEXP = log K + S log Y + 2 log EPV - 3 log RES -
4 log PUP - 5 log PRICE + a6 CAID + 7 SBG +
68FED
The estimated coefficients for income, property wealth, and
the price components are simply income, wealth, and price elasticities.
The marginal impact on expenditures of an additional dollar of
categorical aid, state block grants, or federal aid can be derived
from the respective estimated coefficients. These marginal impacts
are calculated by taking the partial derivative of current expenditures
with respect to a given aid variable. For example, using equation (4.3),
the marginal impact of an additional dollar of categorical aid is:
CEXP 6 K. Y . EPV2 . RES~3 . pUjp~4 . PRICE5.
eCAID 6 * ~~
a CAID a SBG 0 FED
e 6 -e 7 -e 8
= 6 - CEXP (4.4)
Equation (4.4) may be evaluated at the mean level of current expenditures.
6 - CEXP indicates the increase in the level of current expenditures
resulting from an additional dollar of categorical aid at the mean. This
derived marginal impact should be close to that estimated in a linear
model.
The results of the estimation of this hybrid model for each of
the six states will be presented in the next section. The expenditure
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models for each of the states were also estimated using the linear
and log-log specifications. The results of these estimations are
presented in Appendix A.
The Regression Results
The results of the estimated models for each of the six states
will be presented in this section. The discussion of these results
will emphasize the similarities and differences among states and will
offer some speculations as to why these similarities and differences
occur. The description of the results will first focus on the
estimated income and wealth elasticities followed by the various price
elasticities. Finally, the different impacts of the various block
grants will be discussed.
The estimated expenditure models for each of the six states
are presented in Table 4.7.6 Any variable with the prefix L was
entered into the model in log form; all other variables were entered
in linear form. The t-statistics are in parentheses below each of
the estimated coefficients. The mean values and standard deviations
of each of the variables for each state are presented in Table 4.8.
6Each of these models is estimated using cross-section data
for a given school year. The Colorade model is based on data from the
1972 calendar year. The Indiana and Massachusetts models are both
based on data-for the 1976-77 school'year. The Michigan model is
based on data from the 1974-75 school year, while the Minnesota model
uses data from the 1975-76 school year. Finally, the New Jersey model
is based on data for the 19-77-78 sehoel year. See Appendix B for a
complete description of the data for each state.
Table 4.7
*
HYBRID EXPENDITURE MODELS
(Dependent Variable: LCEXP)
Matching Formulae: Block Grants:
Independent Independent
Variables Massachusetts Michigan New Jersey Variables Colorado Indiana Minnesota
C 1.889 -.897 3.380 C 3.155 3.070 5.703
(3.970) (-1.179) (5.618) (4.130) (6.626) (14.346)
LY .387 .363 .213 LY .278 .264 .092
(9.942) (10.657) (3.868) (5.053) (5.589) (3.310)
CAID .0007 .001 .0006 CAID .0008 .0014 .0006
(8.504) (5.901) (3.935) (2.992) (4.659) (14.972)
LPRICE -.124 -.379 -.188 EAID -.0003 .0002 .0001
(-2.963) (-4.871) (-3.318) (-1.146) (2.514) (1.582)
SBG .0001 .0007 .0004 -- -- -- --
(1.509) (6.068) (5.419)
FED .0005 .001 .0003 FED .0009 .0004 .0009
(4.652) (8.201) (1.251) (4.576) (5.032) (11.407)
LEPV .213 .465 .203 LEPV .134 .212 .022
(8.646) (7.183) (5.648) (3.493) (8.246) (.867)
LRES -.048 .002 -.019 LRES -.026 -.007 .017
(-1.159) (.114) (-.457) (-1.780) (-.416) (1.486)
LPUP -.133 -.149 -.064 LPUP -.039 -.172 .031
(-4.227) (-6.583) (-1.453) (-.861) (-5.015) (1.152)
R .6960 .8178 .4084 R .6126 .5061 .5242
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 258 174 287 OBSERVATIONS 109 290 370
*Any variable with the prefix L was entered into the model in log form; all other variables were
entered in linear form. T-statistics are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
I
Table 4.8
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ALL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN
THE EXPENDITURE MODELS
Massachusetts Michigan New Jersey
Standard Standard Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
CEXP 1,612.93 283.54 1,175.66 200.45 2,095.66 430.49
Y 11,549.70 2,367.42 11,267.80 2,458.17 11,993.40 2,882.70
CAID 177.92 73.95 73.44 31.09 155.91 60.20
PRICE .73 .21 .79 .26 .79 .24
SBG 81.37 143.08 181.13 221.25 117.53 160.14
FED 65.10 65.60 53.29 54.89 29.33 40.65
RES 77.09 11.04 48.91 14.17 70.41 14.74
PUP 23.12 4.76 27.27 7.16 18.26 4.50
EPV 50,332.50 30,710.70 25,004.10 11,274.60 98,210.30 63,077.00
'00
Ix
Table 4.8 (Cont.)
Colorado Indiana Minnesota
Standard Standard Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
CEXP 1,025.48 184.04 1,227.33 182.75 1,409.08 175.24
Y 7,992.43 2,021.00 9,548.68 1,440.87 8,015.58 2,147.27
CAID 84.47 61.39 72.30 20.27 285.76 111.05
EAID 277.20 90.36 448.24 109.91 650.13 161.81
FED 52.34 64.15 34.53 78.03 103.17 67.83
RES 35.23 22.89 33.70 11.14 31.58 20.32
PUP 27.97 9.49 25.19 5.41 26.39 4.44
EPV 61,102.40 36,090.90 12,510.50 6,575.91 67,336.20 30,939.70
I
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Income and Wealth Elasticities
As shown in Table 4.7, the income elasticities (Y) for all
six states have the expected positive sign, and all are statistically
significant. The income elasticities for five of the states--
Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey--range from
a high of .39 in Massachusetts to a low of .21 in New Jersey.
Minnesota is the outlier with a relatively low income elasticity
of .092.
In the various versions of their models for Massachusetts,
Ladd estimates income elasticities which range from .41 to .46, while
the income elasticities estimated by Feldstein range from .37 to
.64. In their model of education expenditures for school districts
in California, Grubb and Osman estimate an income elasticity of .154.8
Certainly, the .39 income elasticity estimated for Massachusetts in
this analysis falls within the range of those estimated by Ladd and
Feldstein. The income elasticities for Colorado, Indiana, Michigan,
and New Jersey estimated in this analysis are lower than those
estimated for Massachusetts but greater than those estimated by Grubb
7Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures," p. 151. Feldstein,
"Wealth Neutraility," p. 82.
W. Norton Grubb and Jack W. Osman, "The Causes of School
Finance Inequalities: Serrano and the Case of California," Public
Finance Quarterly, Vol. 5 (July, 1977), p. 380.
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and Osman for California. The reason for the relatively low income
elasticity in Minnesota is unclear.9
The estimated wealth elasticities (EPV) are all positive and
in all states but Minnesota are statistically significant. As
discussed earlier in this Chapter, in Minnesota the correlation
between foundation aid and per pupil property wealth is -.853. This
high correlation may increase the standard error of the estimates and,
therefore, may explain the statistically insignificant wealth elasticity
in Minnesota. As shown in Table 4.7, the wealth elasticities range
from a high of .465 in Michigan to a low of .022 in Minnesota.
The estimated wealth elasticities for Indiana, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey are consistent--all are approximately .21.
This high wealth elasticity in Michigan is similar to that
estimated by Grubb and Osman for California--.465 and .490 respectively.1 0
The estimates for Indiana, Massachusetts, and New Jersey are consistent
with the wealth elasticities estimated by Feldstein. In his basic
9
Vincent and Adams estimated an education expenditure model
using the 1976>JN!nnesota-data. Their estimated income elasticity
is .168. However, Vincent and Adams used gross income per state tax
return as their income variable, while- for this analysis, median
family income was used as the income variable. This difference in
the choice of income measures probably accounts for the different
estimated elasticities. See Vincent and Adams, Fiscal Responses of
School Districts, p. 34.
1 0 Grubb and Osman, "The Causes of School Finance Inequalities,"
p. 380.
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model, Feldstein estimates a wealth elasticity of .28.11 The wealth
elasticities for Colorado and Minnesota are relatively low--.13 and
.022 respectively--when compared with those for the other states in
this analysis and those estimated by Feldstein and Grubb and Osman.1 2
The Price Elasticities
The price elasticity (PRICE) of the matching grants is estimated
for Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Michigan. In each case, the
elasticity has the expected negative sign and is statistically
significant: -.124 in Massachusetts, -.188 in New Jersey, and -.379 in
Michigan. These results indicate that the demand for education is
highly inelastic with respect to the price of education set by a
matching formula. A 100 percent increase in this price term would
only result in a 12 percent decrease in expenditures in Massachusetts,
a 19 percent decrease in New Jersey, and a 38 percent decrease in
Michigan. Large changes in this price component effect relatively
small changes in expenditures.
llFeldstein, "Wealth Neutrality," p. 82.
Ladd uses residential wealth rather than total property wealth,
but the residential wealth elasticities estimated in her models range
from .24 to .30, which are in the same range as the total wealth
elasticities estimated by Feldstein and those estimated in this analysis
for Indiana, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. (See Ladd, "Local Education
Expenditures," p. 151.)
1 2Vincent and Adams estimate residential wealth elasticities for
Colorado and Minnesota using 1973 data for Colorado and 1976 data for
Minnesota. They estimated a residential wealth elasticity of .111 for
Colorado, which is very close to the wealth elasticity estimated in this
analysis. Their residential wealth elasticity for Minnesota is -.065.
This negative elasticity is difficult to interpret. See Vincent and
Adams, Fiscal Responses of Local School Distrcts, pp. 33-34.
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Consider a school district for which the price of education
resulting from the matching formula is equal to .8. This indicates that
the district provides 80 cents of each additional dollar of education
expenditures and the state provides the remaining 20 cents. If the
price was decreased to .4, the district would pay 40 cents of each
additional dollar spent while the state would provide the remaining
60 cents. Thus, reducing the price by one half would result in the
state providing the district with three times as much aid. However,
using the price elasticities presented in Table 4.7, this reduction
in price will only result in an 8.3 percent increase in expenditures
in Massachusetts, a 12.5 percent increase in New Jersey, and a 25.2
percent increase in Michigan.13 Reducing the price of education by
one half results in a very large increase in state aid (three times
that currently allocated), but this increase in aid has a relatively
small impact on spending.
1 3The percent change in price between .8 and .4 depends on which
price is used as the base. A decrease in price from .8 to .4 indicates
a 50 percent change. However, an increase in price from .4 to .8
indicates a 100 percent change. Thus, the direction of the change
in price influences not only whether the impact is positive or negative
but also the size of the impact. Ideally, a change in price from .8
to .4 would have the same absolute impact as a change from .4 to .8.
To get around this problem, the calculation of the impact of the
reduction in price from .8 to .4 is based on the average change in
price:
APRICE
(Price1 + Price2 )/2
or, in this case:
-.4 = -. 666
(.8 + .4)/2 '
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Using the estimated price elasticities presented in Table 4.7,
the marginal impact of an additional dollar of aid allocated through
the matching formula may be calculated. These marginal impacts
indicate what portion of each additional dollar of matching aid is
used to increase expenditures and what portion is used as a substitute
for locally raised revenue. The marginal impact of an additional
14Assuming that: E = A + T and
A = (1 - P)E
where
E = current education expenditures per pupil,
A = equalization aid per pupil,
T = locally raised revenue, and
P = price of education resulting from the matching formula.
- -E + (1 - P) dE
dP dP
dE .dA dE
dA dP dP
substituting
-E + (1 - P)d) dE - dEdP dA dP
dE= (-E + (1- P)d)
dA dP dP
let E = price elasticity:
p
dE = EP)/ (-E + (1- P)E )
=(E EE)/(-E + (1 P)EE )
= E / P + (1 - P)E (4.5)
The marginal impact of an additional dollar of matching aid for a given
state may be calculated by substituting the estimated price elasticity and
the mean price in equation (4.5).
This derivation is an approximattion of the marginal impact. This
derivation is a simplification, since it assumes that districts only receive
equalization aid and, therefore, assumes that no state or federal categori-
cal aid programs exist.
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dollar of matching aid at the mean price is $0.16 in Massachusetts, $0.23
in New Jersey, and $0.44 in Michigan. In other words, an additional
dollar of matching aid increases expenditures by $0.16 in Massachusetts,
$0.23 in New Jersey, and $0.44 in Michigan. The implication of these
results is that an additional dollar of maching aid decreases locally
raised revenue by $0.84 in Massachusetts, $0.77 in New Jersey, and $0.56
in Michigan. A major portion of each dollar serves as a substitute
for locally raised revenue. Districts may use this savings in locally
raised revenue to lower local property taxes or to provide other services.
The results cast some doubt on the conventional theoretical argument
presented in Chapter 2, which suggests that because of the price effect
of matching grants, these grants have a large stimulative effect on spending.
The policy implications of these results will be discussed in Chapter 5.
The other two price variables are the residential share of the
assessed property tax base (RES) and pupils per capita (PUP). Both of
these price variables were included in the expenditure models for all
six states. RES has the expected negative sign in four of the six states.
In Michigan and Minnesota, RES is positive. However, RES is not
statistically significant at the .05 level in any of the six states.
In Ladd's models and Feldstein's models, RES is negative and statis-
tically significant.15 However, Ladd estimates her model for
the 78 Massachusetts cities and towns in the Boston SMSA in 1970.
1 5 Feldstein uses several different techniques to estimate his
expenditure models. In some cases, RES is statistically insignificant.
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Feldstein's sample includes 105 cities and towns in Massachusetts
which accounted for 72 percent of the population in 1970.16 The
Massachusetts sample used for this analysis includes the 258 cities
and towns for which data were available for the 1976-77 school year.
In the preliminary stages of this analysis, the Massachusetts model
was estimated for the 78 cities and towns in the Boston SMSA. In that
model, which is not presented here, RES was negative and statistically
significant. This may indicate that RES is a better proxy for the
tax burden on voters in densely populated urban areas with significant
amounts of commercial and industrial property than the tax burden on
voters living in rural districts. In rural districts in Indiana, for
example, voters may not perceive any difference in the burden of
property taxes on their home versus taxes on farmland. In such cases,
RES would not be an appropriate measure of the tax burden on voters.
In urban areas, it is more likely that voters perceive themselves
bearing the burden of taxes on residential property to a larger extent
than they perceive themselves bearing the burden of taxes on commercial
or industrial property. In a more general specification of the tax
burden term, Ladd uses a search procedure to determine what fraction
of the tax burden on commercial and industrial property residents
perceive they pay. Ladd's results show that residents of cities and
towns in the Boston SMSA perceive themselves bearing only 21 percent
1 6 Ladd, "Local"Education Expenditures," p. 148. Feldstein,
"Wealth Neutraility," p. 81.
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of the taxes on commercial property and 55 percent of the taxes on
industrial property.17
Pupils per capita (PUP) has a negative impact on expenditures in
five of the six states. Of those five states, PUP is statistically
significant in Indiana, Massachusetts, and Michigan and statistically
insignificant in New Jersey and Colorado. In Minnesota, PUP is positive
but statistically insignificant. The implication is that in Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Michigan, the price effect of PUP dominates any taste
differences reflected in PUP. However, the magnitude of the coefficients
in these three states indicates that the effects of changes in PUP on
the level of education expenditures are small. A 100 percent increase in
PUP would result in a decrease in expenditures of 13 percent in Massachu-
setts, 15 percent in Michigan, and 17 percent in Indiana. The insignificant
results in Colorado, Minnesota, and New Jersey may be due to the conflicting
role of PUP in the model--PUP as a price variable with an expected negative
impact versus PUP as a taste variable with an expected positive impact.
Marginal Impacts of the Block Grants
As shown in Table 4.7, the estimated coefficients for categorical aid
(CAID) are positive and statistically significant in all six states. Federal
aid (FED) has a positive impact in all six states and is statistically signifi-
cant in all states except New Jersey. The coefficients for state block grants
(SBG) also have the expected positive signs in the three states with matching
formulae. These coefficients are statistically significant in New Jersey
Ibid., p. 152.
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and Michigan but insignificant in Massachusetts. This insignificant
t-statistic in Massachusetts may be due to the high correlation between
PRICE and SBG. As stated earlier, this correlation is .72 in Massachu-
setts, .66 in Michigan, and .64 in New Jersey. This correlation may
increase the standard error of the estimates, but the estimated
coefficient is still unbiased.
The coefficients for foundation aid (EAID), in the three states
with foundation programs are positive in Indiana and Minnesota. In
Colorado, the estimated coefficient has a perverse negative sign. Only
in Indiana is the coefficient on EAID statistically significant. As
suggested earlier, the high correlations between EAID and EPV may explain
the insignificant t-statistics in Minnesota and Colorado. This
correlation is -.76 in Colorado, -.85 in Minnesota, and -.63 in Indiana.
Again, this high correlation increases the standard errors of the
estimates, but the coefficients remain unbiased.
The aid coefficients given in Table 4.7 are difficult to
interpret. As shown earlier in this Chapter, the marginal impact of
an additional dollar of aid on education expenditures can be calculated
from these coefficients by multiplying the estimated coefficients by
the mean level of current expenditures in a given state. These calculated
marginal impacts of CAID and FED for all six states, as well as the
marginal impacts of SBG in the three states with matching formulae
and EAID in the three states with foundation programs, are presented
in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9
MARGINAL IMPACTS OF BLOCK GRANTS
State CAID FED SBG EAID
Massachusetts 1.13 .81 .16 n.a.
Michigan 1.18 1.18 .82 n.a.
New Jersey 1.26 .63 .84 n.a.
Colorado .82 .92 n.a. -.31
Indiana 1.72 .49 n.a. .25
Minnesota .85 1.27 n.a. .14
n.a. = not applicable
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As shown in the Table, the marginal impacts of categorical aid
(CAID) at the means range from a low of .82 in Colorado to a high of
1.72 in Indiana. In Colorado this implies that an additional dollar
of categorical aid results in $0.82 in additional education expendi-
tures. The remaining $0.18 represents a decrease in the local district's
contribution to education expenditures. In other words, $0.18 of
the additional grant serves as a substitute for a portion of local
education expenditures. The districts may use the $0.18 to provide
other local services or to reduce local property taxes. Similarly,
an additional dollar of state categorical aid to local districts in
Minnesota results in a $0.85 increase in expenditures,which indicates
that $0.15 of the additional dollar serves as a substitute for locally
raised expenditures. In Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New
Jersey, an additional dollar of categorical aid results in more than a
one dollar increase in expenditures. This implies that in these four
states, categorical aid encourages the local districts to spend more
locally raised money on the special programs supported by state categori-
cal aid. The impact of an additional dollar of categorical aid on
spending rages from 1.72 in Indiana to 1.13 in Massachusetts. The
results of these four states support the view presented by Ladd that
"these (categorical) grants are for specialized purposes on which local
communities would have spent less than the allotted amount in the
".18
absence of aid; For example, the categorical aid may be given to
1 8Ibid., p. 150.
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start a particular program which the district did not previously provide.
The program may have been successful or proved worthwhile, and the local
district may decide to allocate a portion of its own revenue to the
project. Thus, as a result of categorical aid, the district was en-
couraged to spend some of its own revenue; and, therefore, expenditures
increased by more than the size of the grant.
The marginal impact of a dollar of categorical aid in Indiana
is considerably higher than for the other five states in this analysis--
1.72 versus 1.26 in New Jersey, which is the second highest marginal
impact of categorical aid given in Table 4.9. One possible explanation
for this large impact is that the types of programs included in categori-
cal aid for Indiana differ substantially from those included in the five
other states. As discussed in Chapter 3, aid for programs for handi-
capped children, vocational education, and compensatory education, is
provided through the foundation program formula in Indiana and is,
therefore, part of equalization aid rather than categorical aid. In the
other five states, state aid for these types of programs is considered
part of categorical aid. The higher impact of categorical aid in
Indiana may indicate that aid for the specific programs covered in
categorical aid in Indiana (summer school, evening school, transportation,
etc.) encourages local districts to spend more than aid for special,
vocational, and compensatory education. These results may suggest that
a focus for future research may be to investigate the impact of categori-
cal aid on spending by type of program for which the aid is given. In
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other words, the focus would be to determine the different impacts of
aid for special education, vocational education, transportation, etc.,
on the level of education expenditure.
Again referring to Table 4.9, the marginal impacts of federal
aid (FED) at the means range from a low of .49 in Indiana to a high
of 1.27 in Minnesota. In Indiana, Colorado, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey, an additional dollar of federal aid results in less than a
dollar increase in spending. This implies that a portion of federal
aid serves as a substitute for locally raised revenue. In Michigan
and Minnesota, an additional dollar of federal aid results in an
increase in expenditures of $1.18 and $1.27 respectively.
As was suggested in the case of categorical aid, the differences
in the response to federal aid among the six states may be due, at
least in part, to the different types of federal aid received by the
districts within each of the states. A major portion of federal aid
for elementary and secondary education is distributed through Title 1
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The Title 1 aid
actually received by local school districts is a function of the number
of pupils which come from low income families and the average per pupil
education expenditures in the state. There is a stipulation that Title 1
aid must be used for additional expenditures, not as a substitute for
local revenue. In a recent study, Feldstein examined the impact of
199
Title 1 aid on school district education expenditures. 19In his
1 9Martin S. Feldstein, "The Effect of a Differential Add-On
Grant: Title 1 and Local Education Spending," The Journal of Human
Resources, Vol. 13 (Fall, 1978), pp. 443-58.
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expenditure model, Feldstein considered Title 1 aid and all other federal
aid separately. He estimated the expenditure model using a sample
of over 4,500 school districts in the U.S. Feldstein's results show
that the marginal impact of an additional dollar of Title 1 aid increases
expenditures by $0.72, while an additional dollar of other federal
aid increases expenditures by $0.41. Feldstein attributes the larger
impact of the Title 1 grants to the effectiveness of the stipulation
that the grants be used as additional money rather than as a substitute
for locally raised revenue.20
Feldstein's results provide one possible explanation for some
of the variation in the marginal impacts of federal aid for the six
states included in this analysis. Across the six states, the portion
of total federal aid that is Title 1 aid is expected to vary. This
variation may result in different impacts of federal aid on expenditures.
Also it may be that the various types of aid combined in Feldstein's
other federal aid variable may have different impacts on expenditures.
Again, as already suggested in the case of state categorical aid, it
may be useful to evaluate the impact of each type of federal aid on
education expenditures.
As shown in Table 4.7, for the three states with foundation
programs, the impact of foundation aid (EAID) on expenditures ranges
from -.31 to .25. The negative effect of foundation aid in Colorado
is difficult to explain. The implication of this finding is that a
2 0Ibid., p. 452.
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dollar of foundation aid results in a decrease in expenditures of $0.31.21
This indicates that a dollar of foundation aid results in local districts
decreasing locally raised revenue for education by more than a dollar.
The reason for this response by local districts is unclear. In Indiana
and Minnesota, an additional dollar of foundation aid increases spending
by only $0.25 and $0.14, respectively. These results indicate that an
additional dollar of foundation aid results in a decrease in locally
raised revenue of $0.75 in Indiana and $0.86 in Minnesota. Foundation
aid in Indiana and Minnesota serves mainly as a substitute for local
revenue and, therefore, has only a small impact on spending.
In the three states with matching formulae, the marginal impacts
of state block grants (SBG) range from .16 to .84. In Massachusetts,
the marginal impact of .16 implies that an additional dollar of SBG
results in only a $0.16 increase in current expenditures. This implies
that $0.84 of each additional dollar serves as a substitute for locally
raised revenue for education. In Michigan and New Jersey, an additional
dollar of SBG increases spending by $0.82 and $0.84, respectively,
indicating that $0.18 and $0.16 of each additional dollar serves as a
substitute for locally raised revenue.
The marginal impact of SBG in Massachusetts is much smaller than
in Michigan and New Jersey. In fact, the marginal impact of SBG
in Massachusetts is consistent with the marginal impacts of foundation
2 1Vincent and Adams estimate Colorado expenditure models using
the 1973 data. In both the linear and log specifications, they estimate
negative equalization aid coefficients,and in both cases the results are
statistically significant. See Vincent and Adams, Fiscal Responses
of School Districts, pp. 29-33.
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aid in Indiana and Minnesota. The large discrepancy between the result
in Massachusetts and those in Michigan and New Jersey may be due to
the different restrictions in the matching formulae in the three states.
As discussed in Chapter 3, in Massachusetts a school district receives
a block grant rather than matching aid if the district's reimbursable
expenditures are above or below certain limits. In New Jersey, the
upper limit is similar to the Massachusetts restriction--if a district's
net current expense budget is above the support limit, the district
receives a block grant.22 The New Jersey legislation places no minimum
on net current expense budget but rather states that no district will
receive less than ten percent the support limit in equalization aid.
Whether or not a district receives this minimum block grant is determined
by both the level of the district's net current expense budget and
the district's property wealth. As a result, a property rich district
with an average to above average net current expense budget may receive
the minimum grant. In other words, under the New Jersey restrictions,
more high spending districts may be receiving block grants than in
Massachusetts,where the lower limit only effects low spending districts.
In Michigan any district which levies more than 25 mills receives a
block grant. The number of mills levied is determined by dividing
locally raised revenue by property wealth. Districts receiving block
grants may either be high spending districts or property poor districts.
2 2The definitions for reimbursable expenditures and net current
expense budget are given in Chapter 3 footnotes 4 and 10, pages 57 and
67, respectively. Both are essentially equal to total locally raised
revenue plus state equalization aid for the previous year.
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Examining the data for each of the three states, some differences
in the types of districts affected by these restrictions are observed.
Of the districts which received block grants in Massachusetts, 50.63
percent were districts with current per pupil education expenditures
below the mean level for the sample. In Michigan 31.71 percent of the
districts receiving block grants had current per pupil expenditures
below the mean level for the sample, while 34.75 percent of the districts
receiving block grants in New Jersey had current per pupil expenditures
below the mean for the sample. As expected, the Massachusetts restrictions
affect more low spending districts than do the restrictions in Michigan
or New Jersey. The combination of low spending and high spending districts
receiving block grants in Massachusetts may serve as one explanation of
why the marginal impact of block grants in Massachusetts is similar to
the impact of foundation aid in Indiana and Minnesota and dissimilar to
the impacts of block grants in Michigan and New Jersey. In Indiana and
Minnesota, all districts--high spending and low spending--receive block
grants. In Michigan and New Jersey, the districts are more homogenous
with more high spending districts receiving block grants.
Low spending districts may be expected to use block grants as
substitutes for locally raised revenue to a larger extent than high
spending districts. A district which spends less on education relative
to other districts may do so because the current level of spending
already places a large tax burden on local residents and additional
spending cannot be seriously considered. The district may provide
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other services which compete with education for the limited revenues
available, or the local residents may just prefer less education. A
block grant to such a district may be expected to serve as a substitute
for local revenue in order that the district may relieve the property
tax burden on local residents, divert locally raised funds to other
services where additional revenue is needed, or provide those services
which the local residents prefer. High spending districts may not
have these types of pressures and, therefore, may be more likely to
use block grants for education to provide additional education services
rather than as substitutes for locally raised revenue. Thus, block
grants to the districts in Michigan and New Jersey may be expected
to have a larger impact on expenditures because a large percentage of
the districts receiving the grants are high spending districts. In
Massachusetts, a much more heterogenous group of districts receive
block grants (as is the case in Indiana and Minnesota), and therefore,
the grants may be used to a larger extent as substitutes for local
revenue and have less of an impact on expenditures.
Summary of the Impacts of Grants on Expenditures
As shown in the discussion in the previous section, categorical
aid had a larger impact on spending than any of the other aid variables
in four of the six states included in this analysis--Indiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, and New Jersey. The marginal impacts of an additional
dollar of categorical aid range from 1.13 to 1.76 in these four states.
In Colorado and Minnesota, federal aid, which for the most part is
also allocated to specific programs, had the largest impact on spending.
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The marginal impact of an additional dollar of federal aid is .92 in
Colorado and 1.27 in Indiana. These results are consistent with the
theoretical argument presented in Chapter 2. Grants tied to specific
programs may be expected to have a greater impact on spending than
general grants because if the size of the grant for the specific program
exceeds the amount allocated by the district to the program, the district
must increase expenditures.
The impacts of general aid to education on the level of spending
probably have more policy implications than the impacts of categorical
and federal aid on spending. Policy makers have tried to achieve the
various goals of school finance reform discussed in the introduction of
this paper through the general aid mechanisms. The results presented
in the previous section show that these mechanisms have relatively little
impact on the level of education expenditures in the six states included
in this analysis. In the three states with matching formulae, the
estimated price elasticities resulting from the matching formulae
show that large changes in the price of education effect relatively
small changes in the level of expenditures. An additional dollar of
matching aid increases expenditures by only $0.16 in Massachusetts, $0.23
in New Jersey, and $0.44 in Michigan. For districts in Massachusetts
above or below the restrictions in the matching formula, state block
grants serve mainly as a substitute for local revenue--each additional
dollar only generates a $0.16 increase in expenditures. State block
grants have a greater impact on spending in Michigan and New Jersey, but
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this impact may be due to the fact that in these states, a large
percentage of the districts receiving the block grants are high spending
districts. Such districts are, for the most part, not the targets
of the various school finance reforms. The results of this analysis
show that a large portion of general aid distributed through foundation
programs also serves as a substitute for locally raised revenue. An
additional dollar of foundation aid results in only a $0.25 increase in
spending in Indiana and a $0.14 increase in Minnesota.
The impacts of the matching grants and foundation grants estimated
in this Chapter raise an important question for policy makers. To
what extent can these general aid mechanisms be used to achieve the
goals of school finance reform? In order to begin to answer that
question, the expenditure models presented in this Chapter will be used
in Chapter 5 to simulate how much aid would have to be pumped through
the foundation program in, say Indiana, to achieve various goals of
school finance reform. Similarly, the estimated expenditure model for
New Jersey may be used to simulate the changes in price or state block
grants that would be required to achieve particular goals. Through
these simulations, it may be determined whether or not certain goals
may be achieved through the current aid mechanisms and how much aid
would be required.
In Chapter 5, the hypothetical goals to be achieved through
the general aid mechanisms will be described. The results of the
simulations will then be presented, followed by a discussion of the
policy implications of these simulations.
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Chapter 5
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the current
concern over the inequalities in educational opportunities that result
from reliance on the local property tax for a large portion of revenues
for public education has prompted many states to reform school funding
laws. The specific goals of this reform vary from state to state but
these goals seem to be directed at either insuring that the level of
per pupil expenditures of a school district is independent of the
district's property wealth (fiscal neutrality) or narrowing the gap in
per pupil expenditures between high spending and low spending school
districts and thereby achieving some degree of equalization of per pupil
expenditures across districts. For the most part, policy makers have
attempted to achieve the various goals of school finance reform by
altering the method of distributing general aid and/or increasing
the amount of general aid provided. General aid to education is usually
provided through a matching or foundation formula. The results presented
in Chapter 4 suggest that large portions of each dollar of general aid
allocated through foundation programs or matching grants serve as a
substitute for locally raised revenues; and therefore, these grants
have relatively small impacts on the level of education expenditures.
Given these results, to what extent can policy makers achieve specific
goals of school finance reform through these aid mechanisms and how much
additional aid would be necessary?
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The purpose of this Chapter is to illustrate how the models
presented in Chapter 4 may be used to determine the feasibility of
achieving specific goals through the current state aid mechanisms and,
if the goals are in fact feasible, to estimate the amount of state
aid that would be required. In this Chapter, the costs of achieving
complete and partial equalization of per pupil education expenditures
across districts and the costs of achieving complete and partial wealth
neutrality through a matching formula and through a foundation program
will be compared and contrasted. These simulations will be presented
for one state with a matching grant and one state with a foundation
program--New Jersey and Indiana, respectively. In the following section,
the specific school finance goals to be tested in the simulations will
be described. The results of the simulations will then be presented.
Finally, the conclusions and policy implications to be drawn from the
expenditure models estimated in Chapter 4 and the simulations presented
in this Chapter will be suggested.
The Simulations
The New Jersey simulations presented in this section will estimate
the amount of aid that the State of New Jersey would have to provide
through its matching formula in order to achieve total and partial
equalization of expenditures across jurisdictions. The simulations will
also estimate the amount of aid that would be required to achieve total
and partial wealth neutrality. The Indiana simulations will indicate
how much foundation aid would be required to achieve the same goals.
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For this analysis, total equalization of per pupil expenditures across
districts would be achieved by giving each district the amount of aid
required to bring that district to a certain fixed level of per pupil
expenditures. The amount of aid each district would have to receive
can be estimated by using the expenditure models presented in Chapter 4.
Using the expenditure model estimated for Indiana, for example, the
amount of foundation aid, EAID., district i must receive in order to
spend some fixed level per pupil, CEXP, can be calculated by:
EAID. = (log CEXP - 3.07 - .264 log Y. - .212 log EPV. +
.007 log RES. + .172 log PUP. - .0014 CAID -
.0004 FED.) / .0002 1 (5.1)
where
CEXP = fixed level of per pupil expenditures, and
all other variables are as defined in equation (4.2).
Similarly, the expenditure model for New Jersey presented in
Chapter 4 may be used to determine the amount of aid necessary for each
district to spend the fixed level per pupil. However, since some
districts in New Jersey receive matching grants while other districts
receive block grants, two separate estimates must be made. For those
districts receiving matching grants, the price of education that the
district must face as a result of the matching grant in order to spend
the fixed level per pupil may be calculated. Using the expenditure
1Recall that all state and federal aid variables were entered into
the model in linear form. All other variables were entered into the
model in log form.
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model estimated for New Jersey, the price, PRICE., district i must face
to spend the fixed level CEXP may be calculated by:
Z. = (log CEXP - 3.380 - .213 log Y. - .203 log EPV. +
.019 log RES. + .064 log PUP. - .0006 CAID - .0003 FED -
.0004 SBG) / -.188 (5.2)
where
Z. = log PRICE.,
CEXP = the fixed level of per pupil expenditures,
and all other variables are as defined in equation (4.1).
From this calculated price, PRICE., the amount of aid the district
must receive in order to spend CEXP may be determined.2 For those
districts in New Jersey which receive state block grants (SBG), the
block grant necessary to bring district i to the fixed expenditures
level is:
SBG = (log CEXP - 3.380 - .213 log Y. - .203 log EPV. +
.019 log RES. + .064 log PUP. - .0006 CAID - .0003 FED +
.188 log PRICE) / .0004 (5.3)
where
CEXP = fixed level of expenditures, and
all other variables are as defined in equation (4.1).
2In New Jersey, the amount of aid a district receives would simply
be (1 - PRICE.)(NCEB.) where NCEB. = net current expense budget for
district i for the previous year. Since the data assembled for this
analysis do not include data for the previous year, aid was estimated on
the basis of current year data. This will result in an overestimate of
the aid necessary to achieve equalization of expenditures.
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In the simulations presented in this Chapter, the target (fixed)
level of per pupil expenditures is that level which constitutes the 65th
percentile when per pupil expenditures for all districts in the sample
for each state are ranked from lowest to highest. This level was
chosen because most state aid programs have spending limits where
districts with expenditures above the limits are not eligible for aid
under the program. These limits essentially serve as a target level
of per pupil expenditures for the aid program. Generally, these limits
are set at some level above the mean expenditures for school districts
within the state. For example, districts in Massachusetts with reimbursable
expenditures above 1.1 times average reimbursable expenditures in the
State are not eligible for matching aid. In New Jersey, districts with
a net current expense budget above that for the district in the 65th
percentile when the net current expense budgets of all districts are
ranked from lowest to highest are not eligible for matching aid. In
both states, districts above the spending limits receive block grants.
Per pupil expenditures for the district in the 65th percentile in the
New Jersey sample are $2,135.76 and $1,267.56 in the Indiana sample.
For some high spending school districts, the amount of aid
necessary to bring per pupil expenditures down to the 65th percentile
may be negative. In other words, in order to achieve total equalization
of expenditures, some type of taxing mechanism may be required to bring
high spending districts down to the target level of per pupil expenditures.
In many states, it may be difficult to pass school finance legislation
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which requires that high spending districts be taxed in order to
decrease their levels of expenditures to some level fixed by the state.
Such legislation may be considered too great an infringement of local
control over public education. For this reason, two additional goals
which only involve partial equalization of per pupil expenditures are
also considered in this analysis. These two goals would not require
that any district be taxed. In the first case, any district that would
receive negative aid under the total equalization program would simply
be given no aid. Thus, some districts may spend more than the target
amount, but the gap in per pupil expenditures between high spending and
low spending districts would certainly be narrowed. The program would
require more aid than total equalization of expenditures because under
this program, no revenue (negative aid) is collected from high spending
districts but the program does not require a taxing mechanism.
The second partial equalization goal which will be considered
involves giving all districts with per pupil expenditures below the
65th percentile the aid required to bring their per pupil expenditures
to the 65th percentile. Such a program sets a minimum level of per
pupil expenditures in the state and insures that expenditures in all
districts meet that minimum. Any district spending above the target
level will be given the amount of aid received prior to the new legisla-
tion. This program should require more state aid than the partial
equalization program described above because this program involves no
reduction in aid to any district. This program may be looked on more
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favorably by a state legislature than the other two programs described
above because it does not penalize high spending districts by decreasing
the level of aid which they receive,and it still increases aid to low
spending districts and, therefore, may narrow the gap between per pupil
expenditures in high spending and low spending districts.
The final set of school finance reform goals to be considered
involves total and partial wealth neutrality. Total wealth neutrality
is defined as the situation when a school district's level of current
expenditures is completely independent of the district's property wealth.
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the wealth neutrality
concept has been used in many court decisions involving school finance.
In order to achieve total wealth neutrality, state aid to education
may be distributed in such a way that the combined impacts of aid and
wealth on expenditures are equal to the effect of some constant level
of wealth. For example, the price of education resulting from the
matching formula maybe adjusted for districts in New Jersey which
receive matching grants in such a way that the combined effects of the
price and property wealth of each district are set equal to some constant.
The coefficients for PRICE and EPV estimated in the New Jersey expenditure
model presented in Chapter 4 measure the effect of these variables on
expenditures. Using those estimated coefficients, total wealth
neutrality for those districts in New Jersey receiving matching grants
is achieved when the combined price and wealth effects are set equal
to some constant wealth effect. Using the price and wealth coefficients
- 127 -
estimated in the New Jersey expenditure model, wealth neutrality is
achieved when:
-.188 log(PRICE.) + .203 log(EPV.) = .203 log(EPV) (5.4)
- 1
where
PRICE. = price of education for district i resulting from the
matching formula,
EPV. = per pupil equalized property value for district i, and
EPV = some fixed level of per pupil property wealth.
The price, PRICE., each district must face in order that the impact
of wealth on expenditures is constant for all districts can be determined
by rearranging equation (5.4):
.203 log (EPV/EPV.)
Zi -.188
where
Z.. = log PRICE..
Again, the amount of aid that each district would receive may be
determined by subtracting the calculated price from 1 and multiplying
the result by the net current expense budget.
For those districts in New Jersey which receive block grants (SBG ),
total wealth neutrality may be achieved when:
.0004 SBG. + .203 log EPV. = .203 log (EPV) (5.4)
where
SBG. = state block grant to district i,
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EPV. = per pupil equalized property value for district i, and
EPV = some fixed level of per pupil equalized property value.
The block grant each district must receive in order that the impact
of property wealth on expenditures is constant for all districts can
be determined by rearranging equation (5.5):
.203 log (EPV/EPV,)
SBG =
1 .0004
Similarly, for Indiana, the impacts of foundation aid and property
wealth may be set equal to some constant wealth effect. Using the
foundation aid and wealth coefficients estimated in the Indiana expendi-
ture model, total wealth neutrality may be achieved when:
.0002 EAID. + .212 log EPV. = .212 log EPV (5.6)
where
EAID. = foundation aid to district i,
EPV. = per pupil equalized property value for district i, and
EPV = some fixed level of per pupil equalized property value.
Again, the foundation grant each district must receive to achieve wealth
neutrality may be determined by rearranging equation (5.6):
.212 log (EPV/EPV.)
EAID =.02i .0002
In the simulations for Indiana and New Jersey, the fixed level of per
pupil property wealth, EPV, was set equal to 1.35 times the mean per
pupil wealth for all districts in the sample -- $16,889.18 in Indiana
and $132,583.88 in New Jersey.
3In Indiana property is assessed at one-third full market value;
while in New Jerseyproperty is assessed at full market value.
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As was the case for the total expenditure equalization goal
discussed earlier, the amount of aid necessary to achieve the total
wealth neutrality described above may be negative for some school
districts. Again, because it may be difficult to pass school finance
legislation which involves taxing school districts, a partial wealth
neutrality goal is also considered. Under partial wealth neutrality,
any district which would receive negative aid under total wealth
neutrality would simply receive no aid. For these districts, the
impact of wealth may vary from the constant level set by the state.
However, this program would be expected to bring the state school
finance system closer to wealth neutrality.
The Simulation Results
The total amounts of state aid which must be allocated through
the equalization program in New Jersey and the foundation program in
Indiana to achieve the expenditure equalization and wealth neutrality
goals described in the previous section were calculated in the simula-
tions. The results are presented in Table 5.1. The amount of state
aid actually allocated during the school year considered in the expendi-
tures models for Indiana and New Jersey--1976-1977 and 1977-1978
respectively--is also given in the Table. The percent change in
4
4$628,368,240 is an estimate of the actual equalization aid
received by districts in the New Jersey sample in 1977-1978. The
districts actually received $520,552,816. The estimate combines actual
state block grants received with an estimate of the dollar amount of
matching grants received. The dollar amount of matching grants received
(continued on next page)
Table 5.1
CHANGES IN TOTAL AID UNDER EXPENDITURE EQUALIZATION
AND WEALTH NEUTRALITY
Finance Goals
State Aid Currently Received
State Aid Necessary to Achieve:
Total Equalization of
Expenditures
Partial Equalization of
Expenditures (no taxing
mechanism)
Partial Equalization of
Expenditures (no decrease
in aid for districts above
the 65th percentile)
Total Wealth Neutrality
Partial Wealth Neutrality
(no taxing mechanism)
Indiana
Amount of Aid
(dollars)
505,049,344
572,270,080
598,704,640
704,278,784
368,889,344
398,679,040
Percent
Change
13.31
18.54
39.45
-26.96
-20.06
New Jersey
Amount of Aid
(dollars)
*
628,368,240
883,492,928
893,699,376
922,704,288
717,688,624
729,254,128
*This is an estimate of current aid (see footnote 4).
Percent
Change
40.60
42.23 0
46.84
14.21
16.06
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current aid necesssary to achieve each of the goals is also presented
in Table 5.1.
The results presented in Table 5.1 show that in order to achieve
total equalization of per pupil expenditures (all districts spending
at the level of the district in the 65th percentile) a 13.31 percent
increase in aid would be required in Indiana while a 40.60 percent
increase in aid would be required in New Jersey. The large increase
in aid required in New Jersey relative to the increase required in
Indiana may be due, at least in part, to the fact that there is more
variation in per pupil expenditures among the districts in the New
Jersey sample than among the districts in the Indiana sample. As
shown in Table 4.8, the mean per pupil expenditures for districts in
New Jersey is $2,095.66 with a standard deviation of $430.49 (coefficient
of variation = .21). The mean per pupil expenditures in Indiana is
$1,227.33 with a standard deviation of $182.75 (coefficient of
4 (continued)
is calculated by subtracting the actual price of education resulting
from the matching grant in 1977-1978 from 1 and multiplying this fraction
by 1977-1978 current per pupil expenditures minus per pupil categorical
aid. This is an over estimate of the matching aid actually received
because actual aid is based on the net current expense budget of the
previous year. The data for this analysis do not include data for the
previous school year; and therefore, the state aid calculations in the
simulations are based on an estimate of current year (not previous)
net current expense budget. It would be difficult to compare the aid
calculated in the simulations with actual aid received because the
calculated aid and actual aid are based on different years. In order
to permit comparison, estimated current aid for New Jersey is used in
this analysis.
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variation = .15). Under total equalization of expenditures, 12.54
percent of the school districts in New Jersey would receive negative
aid and 8.28 percent of the districts in Indiana would receive
negative aid.
In Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the mean, standard deviation, minimum,
and maximum levels of per pupil expenditures and per pupil state aid
for districts in Indiana and New Jersey, respectively, under each of
the school finance goals are presented. The Tables also present the
mean, standard deviation, maximum, and mimimum actual per pupil
expenditures and state aid for each of the states. In Indiana, the
mean actual per pupil expenditures is $1,227.33 with a standard deviation
of $183.08. The mean state aid received is $448.24 with a standard
deviation of $110.27. The minimum per pupil aid actually received is
$180.27 while the maximum per pupil aid is $954.18. Under total
equalization of expenditures, all districts spend $1,267.56 per pupil.
The mean per pupil aid under total equalization increases to $631.69
with a standard deviation of $473.89. The minimum per pupil aid under
this program is -$1,331.33 while the maximum is $1,652.46. In New
Jersey, the mean actual expenditures is $2,095.66 with a standard
deviation of $431.26. The mean per pupil state aid actually received
is $499.99 with a standard deviation of $364.83. The minimum per
pupil aid actually received is $142.50 while the maximum is $2,095.92.
Under total equalization of expenditures, all districts spend $2,135.76
per pupil. The mean per pupil aid under this program is $689.25 with a
Table 5.2
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES AND STATE AID UNDER EXPENDITURE EQUALIZATION
AND WEALTH NEUTRALITY: INDIANA
(dollars)
Per Pupil Expenditures Per Pupil State Aid
Standard Standard
Finance Goals Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Current Expenditures and 1,227.33 183.08 847.00 2,114.37 448.24 110.14 180.27 954.18
State Aid
Expenditures and State Aid
Resulting From:
Total Equalization of
Expenditures 1,267.56 0 1,267.56 1,267.56 631.69 473.89 -1,331.33 1,652.46
Partial Equalization of
Expenditures (no taxing
mechanism) 1,278.30 52.03 1,267.56 1,721.68 665.52 393.72 0 1,652.46
Partial Equalization of
Expenditures (no
decrease in aid for
districts above the
65th percentile) 1,297.61 85.39 1,267.56 1,881.69 725.72 326.35 180.27 1,652.46
Total Wealth Neutrality 1,193.25 77.27 1,036.15 1,929.77 361.12 372.78 -1,111.62 
1,444.90
Partial Wealth Neutrality
(no taxing mechanism) 1,204.88 94.15 1,036.15 1,929.77 399.70 291.87 0 1,444.90
I
Table 5.3
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES AND STATE AID UNDER EXPENDITURE EQUALIZATION
AND WEALTH NEUTRALITY: NEW JERSEY
(dollars)
Per Pupil Expenditures Per Pupil State Aid
Standard Standard
Finance Goals Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Current Expenditures and
State Aid* 2,095.66 431.26 1,343.03 4,269.27 499.99 364.83 142.50 2,095.92
Expenditures and State Aid
Resulting From:
Total Equalization of
Expenditures 2,135.76 0 2,135.76 2,135.76 689.25 635.66 -1,082.43 2,511.16
Partial Equalization of
Expenditures (no taxing
mechanism) 2,167.99 133.13 2,135.76 3,365.05 721.26 584.65 0 2,511.16
Partial Equalization of
Expenditures (no
decrease in aid for
districts above the
65th percentile) 2,211.56 185.93 2,135.76 3,608.94 766.05 542.18 152.59 2,511.16
Total Wealth Neutrality 2,028.03 114.35 1,764.44 2,704.79 527.23 542.75 -569.18 2,282.25
Partial Wealth Neutrality
(no taxing mechanism) 2,059.05 182.18 1,764.44 3,365.05 558.98 499.51 0 2,282.25
*
This is an estimate of current aid (see footnote 4).
I-
4S
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standard deviation of $635.66. The minimum per pupil aid received by
a district under this total equalization program is '$1,082.43 while
the maximum per pupil aid received is $2,511.16. These results show
that while total equalization of expenditures eliminates variation in
per pupil expenditures, variation in state aid to districts increases
substantially.
Under the first partial equalization goal, it is assumed that
the state school finance legislation does not include a taxing mechanism;
and therefore, those districts that would receive negative aid and as
a result would be taxed under total equalization of per pupil expenditures
are simply given no aid. As shown in Table 5.1, this partial equalization
program would require an 18.54 percent increase in aid in Indiana and
a 42.23 percent increase in New Jersey. As expected, this program
requires more aid than total equalization because no districts receive
negative aid under this program and, therefore, no revenue is generated.
As shown in Table 5.2, the mean per pupil expenditures in Indiana
under this partial equalization program is $1,278.30 with a standard
deviation of $52.03. This variation in expenditures is considerably
smaller than the variation in current expenditures--the coefficient
of variation in expenditures is .04 under the partial equalization
program and .15 for current expenditures. The mean per pupil state
aid distributed under this program is $665.52 with a standard deviation
of $393.72. There is less variation in aid under thiaprogram than
under total equalization because no districts receive negative aid.
As shown in Table 5.3, the mean per pupil expenditure in New Jersey
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under this partial equalization program is $2,167.99 with a standard
deviation of $133.13. Again, this variation in expenditures is
considerably smaller than the variation in current expenditures--the
coefficient of variation in expenditures is .06 under this program
and .21 for current expenditures. The mean per pupil state aid
distributed to New Jersey districts under this program is $721.26
with a standard deviation of $584.65.
The second partial equalization program considered in this
analysis allocates the aid necessary to bring those districts with
current expenditures below the 65th percentile up to that level.
Districts spending above the 65th percentile are given the same
amount of aid received prior to the new legislation.5 As shown in
Table 5.1, this partial equalization program would require a 46.84
percent increase in aid in New Jersey and a 39.45 percent increase
in aid in Indiana. In New Jersey, the increase in aid necessary to
achieve this goal is similar to that required for total equalization
or partial equalization with no tax mechanism. In Indiana, this program
would cost the state substantially more than total equalization or partial
5Whether or not a district's expenditures were above or below the
65th percentile was determined by the level of expenditures predicted
by the expenditure model estimated for the state rather than actual
expenditures. If actual expenditures had been used, some districts
may still receive negative aid. For example, a district's actual
expenditures may be below the 65 percentile but the model may predict
that expenditures for that district are above that level. If actual
expenditures are used in this instance, the simulation will calculate
the amount of aid necessary to bring the district's expenditures to the
65th percentile. Since the model would have predicted the district's
expenditures to be above that level, the model may generate negative
aid for that district. For this reason, predicted expenditures were
used in this analysis.
- 137 -
equalization with no taxing mechanisms. One reason for this increase
is that the per pupil aid actually received by many of the large school
districts in Indiana for the 1976-1977 school year exceeds the
amounts these districts would receive under total equalization of
expenditures or partial equalization with no taxing mechanism. In
fact, of the 22 school districts in Indiana with more than 10,000 pupils,
16 received more foundation aid per pupil in 1976-1977 than would have
been the case under total equalization or partial equalization with no
taxing mechanism. Because these dsitricts have so many pupils, the total
increase in aid to these districts becomes quite large. This may, at
least in part, explain the percent increase in aid necessary to achieve
this partial equalization goal in Indiana.
As shown in Table 5.2, under this partial equalization goal, the
mean per pupil expenditures in Indiana is $1,297.61 with a standard
deviationof $85.39. The coefficient of variation is .07 which indicates
that the variation in expenditures under this program is considerably
less than the variation in current expenditures. The mean level of
per pupil state aid under this program is $725.72 with a standard
deviation of $326.35. There is less variation in state aid under this
partial equalization program than under total equalization or partial
equalization with no negative aid. As shown in Table 5.3, the mean
per pupil expenditures under this program is $2,211.56 in New Jersey
with a standard deviationof $185.93. The coefficient of variation is
.08 which indicates that the variation in expenditures resulting from
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this program is considerably less than the variation in current expendi-
tures. The mean level of per pupil state aid is $766.05 with a standard
deviationof $542.18. Again, there is less variation in state aid under
this partial equalization program than under total equalization or
partial equalization with no negative aid.
The amount of aid required to achieve total wealth neutrality
is considerably lower than that necessary to achieve total equalization
of expenditures or either form of partial equalization in both states.
This result may be expected since under wealth neutrality aid is being
used to counteract just the effect of wealth on spending rather than
to effect specific changes in expenditures. In New Jersey, total
wealth neutrality would require a 14.21 percent increase in equalization
aid currently allocated. In Indiana, total wealth neutrality would
actually result in a 26.96 percent decrease in the amount of foundation
aid currently allocated. The large differences between the amount of
aid necessary in New Jersey and that necessary in Indiana may be explained,
at least in part, by the difference in the amount of variation in
property wealth among districts in the two states. As shown in Table
4.8, the mean per pupil property wealth in New Jersey is $98,210.3
with a standard deviation of $63,007.0 (coefficient of variation = .64).
In Indiana, the mean per pupil property wealth is $12,510.50 with a
standard deviation of $6,575.91 (coefficient of variation = .53). In
New Jersey, equalization aid must counteract the impacts of a wide
variation in wealth across districts. Since Indiana has less
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variation, total wealth neutrality might be expected to cost less there
than in New Jersey.
As shown in Table 5.2, the mean per pupil expenditures in
Indiana under total wealth neutrality is $1,193.25 with a standard
deviation of $77.27. The coefficient of variation in expenditures is
.06 under this program which is less than the variation in current
expenditures. There is a great deal of variation in the per pupil
aid required to achieve total wealth neutrality in Indiana. The mean
per pupil state aid under this program is $361.12 with a standard
deviation of $372.78. The minimum aid distributed under this program
is -$1,111.62 while the maximum is $1,444.90. As shown in Table 5.3,
the mean per pupil expenditures in New Jersey under total wealth neutrality
is $2,028.03 with a standard deviationof$114.35. There is less
variation in expenditures under this program than in current expenditures
(coefficient of variation = .06). Again, there is a great deal of
variation in the aid distributed under this program. The mean per pupil
aid is $527.23 with a standard deviation of $542.75. The minimum aid
received is -$569.18 while the maximum is $2,282.25.
Under total wealth neutrality, 15.68 percent of the districts in
New Jersey would receive negative aid and, therefore, have to be taxed.
In Indiana, 11.38 percent of the districts would have to be taxed to
achieve total wealth neutrality. If the school finance legislation
does not include a taxing mechanism, the aid for these districts may
be set equal to 0. Under this partial wealth neutrality program,
there will be some variation in the impact of wealth on expenditures.
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This program will require more aid than total wealth neutrality because
there is no revenue generated since no districts are taxed. Partial
wealth neutrality would require a 16.06 percent increase in equalization
aid in New Jersey and a 20.06 decrease in aid in Indiana.
As shown in Table 5.2, the mean per pupil expenditures in Indiana,
under partial wealth neutrality is $1,204.88 with a standard deviation
of $94.15 (coefficient of variation = .08). The mean per pupil aid
under this program is $399.70 with a standard deviation of $291.87.
As shown in Table 5.3, mean per pupil expenditures under this partial
wealth neutrality program in New Jersey is $2,059.05 with a standard
deviation of $182.18 (coefficient of variation = .09). The mean per
pupil aid under this program is $558.98 with a standard deviation of
$499.51.
Summary and Conclusions
There are three major conclusions which may be drawn from the
results of the expenditure models presented in Chapter 4 and the results
of the simulations presented in this Chapter. First, the estimated
expenditure models show that neither matching grants nor foundation aid
have much of a stimulative effect on local education expenditures. The
results consistently show that a major portion of the aid allocated
through these mechanisms serves as a substitute for locally raised
revenue and, therefore, has little impact on total spending. An
additional dollar of foundation aid resulted in a -$0.31 to $0.25
change in current expenditures in the three states with foundation
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programs examined in this analysis. For the three states with matching
formulae, the results presented in Chapter 4 show that large changes
in the price of education resulting from the matching formula effect
relatively small changes in expenditures. An additional dollar of aid
allocated through the price mechanism in a matching formula results in
a $0.16 to $0.44 change in current expenditures for the three states
with matching formulae examined in this analysis. In Massachusetts,
an additional dollar of block grants (SBG) received by districts above
or below the matching limits results in only a $0.16 increase in
expenditures. In Michigan and New Jersey, an additional dollar of SBG
has a much larger impact--$0.82 and $0.84 respectively. However, in
these two states, a large portion of the districts which receive block
grants are high spending districts. The relatively small impacts of
foundation aid and matching grants estimated in the expenditure models
raised considerable doubts about the feasibility of achieving various
goals of school finance reform through these aid mechanisms.
The second major conclusion of this analysis may be drawn from
the simulations presented in this Chapter. These simulations show
that, in spite of the relatively small impacts of matching grants and
foundation aid, two popular goals of school finance reform--total
equalization of expenditures across school districts and total wealth
neutrality--may be achieved through these mechanisms in New Jersey and
Indiana. Total equalization of expenditures would require a 40.60
percent increase in state aid in New Jersey and a 13.31 percent increase
in Indiana. These increases are substantial, particularly in New Jersey,
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but they are increases which the state may be able to provide. In
New Jersey, total equalization of expenditures would require an additional
$255 million which may well be feasible,especially considering the fact
that the New Jersey Public School Education Act of 1975 increased aid
to education by $400 million.6 Total wealth neutrality is also a
feasible goal using the existing aid mechanisms in Indiana and New
Jersey. Total wealth neutrality would require a 14.21 percent increase
in aid in New Jersey and an actual decrease in aid in Indiana of
26.96 percent.
Although the simulations show that the total amount of state aid
required to achieve total equalization and wealth neutrality may well
be feasible, the distribution of aid required to achieve these goals
may be politically infeasible. For example, under total equalization
of expenditures, the minimum aid received by districts in New Jersey
is -$1,082.43 per pupil while the maximum is $2,511.16. It may be
difficult to convince a state legislature that the state should provide
one district with $2,511.16 per pupil in order to get that district
to spend only $2,135.76 per pupil while another district in the state
is taxed $1,082.43 per pupil. Similarly, in Indiana, a minimum of
-$1,111.62 per pupil in state aid and a maximum of $1,444.90 per pupil
6
$255 million would be required to achieve total equalization
across the 287 kindergarten through twelfth grade districts included in
this analysis. The sample did not include 56 kindergarten through
twelfth grade districts and regional and vocational districts which do
receive aid under the New Jersey Public School Education Act of 1975.
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would be required to achieve total wealth neutrality. Again, it may
be difficult for a state legislature to consider such wide variation
in the amount of aid received by districts. A state legislature may
be willing to modify the goals of the school finance reform in order
to decrease the variation in the amount of aid received by districts.
The simulations presented in this Chapter consider two such
modifications of the total equalization goal and one modification of the
total wealth neutrality goal. The first partial equalization goal
considered does not permit any district to be taxed (no negative aid).
The second partial equalization goal increases aid in order to bring
districts with spending below the 65th percentile up to that level
but permits no decrease in aid to districts spending above the 65th
percentile. Both of these partial equalization goals permit some
variation in per pupil expenditures. The simulations show that in both
states, this variation in expenditures under these partial programs is
considerably less than the variation in current per pupil expenditures.
The simulations also show that there is less variation in per pupil
state aid under these partial equalization programs than under total
equalization. For example, in New Jersey, the coefficient of variation
for per pupil state aid under total equalization of expenditures is .92.
The coefficient of variation under partial equalization with no negative
aid and partial equalization with no decrease in aid is .81 and .70,
respectively. While both partial equalization goals decrease the
variation in per pupil state aid, the total amount of state aid required
to achieve these partial goals is greater than the amount necessary
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to achieve total equalization. For example, as shown in Table 5.1,
total equalization of expenditures would require a 13.31 percent increase
in total aid in Indiana. Partial equalization with no negative aid
and partial equalization with no decrease in aid would require an
18.54 percent and 39.45 percent increase, respectively. Under partial
wealth neutrality, no district may receive negative aid. As shown in
Tables 5.2 and 5.3, the variation in per pupil state aid under this
partial program is less in both Indiana and New Jersey than is the
case under total wealth neutrality. However, as shown in Table 5.1,
this partial wealth neutrality goal requires more total state aid
in both Indiana and New Jersey than total wealth neutrality.
The third major conclusion of this analysis may be drawn from
the comparisons of the simulations of total equalization and partial
equalization and total wealth neutrality and partial wealth neutrality
presented above. As shown above, both total equalization and total
wealth neutrality create wide variations in the amount of state aid
per pupil received by school districts. If state legislatures find
this variation unacceptable, modified equalization or wealth neutrality
goals may be considered. The modified goals considered in this analysis
decreased the variation in state aid per pupil across school districts,
but in each case, these modified goals required more total aid than
the original goals. These results indicate that there is a tradeoff
between what is an acceptable distribution of aid (how much variation
is too much variation?) and how much additional aid is required. The
results presented in this analysis show that decreasing the variation in
state aid across districts increases the total cost to the state.
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APPENDIX A
Linear and Log Expenditure Models
The results of the estimated expenditures models for each of
the six states using linear and log-log specifications are presented
in Tables A.l and A.2, respectively. All variables are those defined
in equation (4.1), p. 79 and equation (4.2), p. 83. In the log-log
expenditure models presented in Table A-2, all variables have the
prefix L. The t-statistics are in parentheses below each of the
estimated coefficients.
Table A.1
*
LINEAR EXPENDITURE MODELS
(Dependent Variable: CEXP)
Matching Formulae: Block Grants:
Independent Independent
Variables Massachusetts Michigan New Jersey Variables Colorado Indiana Minnesota
C 979.677 582.624 1,523.72 C 764.871 793.135 665.717
(8.777) (8.314) (7.191) (5.823) (8.656) (7.265)
Y .055 .038 .043 y .037 .037 .017
(10.001) (9.216) (4.402) (5.323) (5.497) (3.225)
CAID 1.332 1.430 1.253 CAID .716 1.717 .951
(8.969) (5.229) (3.338) (2.848) (4.111) (16.694)
PRICE 11.090 -236.324 -225.288 EAID -.518 .096 .137
(.113) (-2.317) (-1.401) (-2.164) (.941) (1.776)
SBG -. 115 .436 .648 -- -- -- --
(-.871) (4.165) (3.638)
FED .733 1.309 .931 FED .716 .530 1.310
(4.281) (7.824) (1.570) (3.809) (5.117) (13.054)
EPV .003 .012 .003 EPV .002 .014 .0003
(6.882) (6.943) (6.056) (2.974) (7.917) (.798)
RES -1.337 -.192 -1.527 RES -1.672 -.449 1.192
(-1.264) (-.298) (-.958) (-2.747) (-.530) (1.981)
PUP -14.731 -6.929 -12.548 PUP -.900 -10.380 2.022
(-6.004) (-5.989) (-2.331) (-.721) (-6.202) (1.413)
R2  .6689 .7866 .4139 R2  .6081 .4629 .5900
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 258 174 287 OBSERVATIONS 109 290 370
*T-statistics are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
a'
I
Table A.2
*
LOG EXPENDITURE MODELS
(Dependent Variable: LCEXP)
Matching Formulae: Block Grants:
Independent Independent
Variables Massachusetts Michigan New Jersey Variables Colorado Indiana Minnesota
C 1.614 2.030 3.962 C 3.232 1.789 4.569
(3.388) (3.597) (6.302) (3.540) (2.741) (9.515)
LY .407 .387 .188 LY .271 .360 .137
(9.793) (9.168) (3.252) (4.838) (7.006) (4.368)
LCAID .059 .095 .110 LCAID .075 .147 .212
(5.250) (5.838) (4.146) (3.502) (5.510) (13.703)
LPRICE -.136 -.010 -.150 LEAID -.046 .030 -.002
(-3.030) (-.191) (-2.916) (-.858) (.697) (-.075)
LSBG .010 .011 .027 -- -- -- --
(2.173) (1.856) (4.981)
LFED .040 .062 .006 LFED .035 .044 .110
(3.869) (6.652) (.796) (3.763) (4.593) (9.442)
LEPV .206 .142 .131 LEPV .124 .184 -.032
(8.841) (3.621) (3.900) (3.571) (6.401) (-1.527)
LRES -.082 -.031 -.016 LRES -.040 -.008 .015
(-1.826) (-1.440) (-.383) (-2.538) (-.435) (1.195)
LPUP -. 132 -. 165 -. 066 LPUP -. 037 -. 197 .026
(-3.666) (-6.281) (-1.449) (-.794) (-5.623) (.899)
R .6292 .7530 .3825 R2 .5925 .4961 .4568
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 258 174 287 OBSERVATIONS 109 290 370
*T-statistics are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
-1
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APPENDIX B
Data Sources
In an attempt to create consistent data sets for each of the
six states included in this analysis, data were obtained from a wide
variety of sources. The following is a description of these data
sources by state.
Colorado
The expenditure models estimated for Colorado are based on data
collected for the 1973 calendar year. Data on current expenditures,
state and federal aid, pupils, and the composition of the property
tax base were obtained from the Colorado Department of Education.
Total equalized property values of school districts were estimated
from data obtained from the Colorado Division on Property Taxation
which included total assessed property value by school district,
assessment to sales ratios, and assessor's market value by county.1
The median family income and population data were obtained from
the fourth count of the 1970 Census of Population.2 These data are
1This data on current expenditures, state and federal aid, pupils,
residential share of the districts' assessed property tax base, and
esimates of total equalized property values were assembled and provided
by Phillip E. Vincent and E. Kathleen Adams at the Education Finance
Center, Education Commission of the States. These data are further
described in Phillip E. Vincent and E. Kathleen Adams, Fiscal Responses of
School Districts, A Study of Two States--Colorado and Minnesota (Denver:
Education Finance Center, Education Commission of the States, October,
1978), p. 39.
2The fourth count of the 1970 Census of Population provides
population characteristics by school districts. Copies of the computer
printout of this fourth count for each of the six states included in
this analysis were obtained from the National Center for Education
Statistics.
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only available for districts with enrollments greater than 300. As a
result, these data were only available for 109 of the 174 school
districts in Colorado. The data base used in this analysis included
those 109 school districts.
Indiana
The expenditure models estimated for Indiana are based on data
collected for the 1976-77 school year. Indiana has 305 school corpora-
tions (districts) each providing kindergarten through twelfth grade
education programs. The expenditure, state and federal aid, pupil, and
equalized property valuation data were obtained from reports published
in 1976, 1977 Report of Statistical Information for Indiana School
Corporations by the Indiana Department of Public Instruction. Current
expenditures for this analysis were defined as total cost minus capital
outlay. State aid to corporations was divided into two categories:
the basic grant allocated by the foundation program and categorical
aid which is total state support minus the basic grant and includes aid
for transportation, summer school, evening school, etc. The pupil data
used for this analysis is average daily membership which is the count of
all pupils enrolled in grades kindergarten through twelve with
kindergarten pupils weighted by .5. Equalized property values of school
corporations are estimated by the State Board of Tax Commissioners. All
property is valued at one-third true cash value.
Neither the State Board of Tax Commissioners nor the Department
of Public Instruction collect data on the composition of the assessed
property tax base by school corporation. No other source of such data
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was found. However, the State Board of Tax Commissioners has a break-
down of the assessed tax base in 1977 by county. These data were used
to obtain the residential share of the assessed tax base for each of
the 92 counties in the State. The residential share for each county
was then assigned to each school corporation within its boundaries. All
school corporations are within the boundaries of one county.
Median family income and total population of the school corporation
were obtained from the fourth count of the 1970 Census of Population.
There were nine cases where corporations boundaries changed between 1970
and 1976. Because the fourth count census data are avialable only for
corporations with enrollments greater than 300, no income or population
data were available for seven of the school corporations. As a result,
only corporations for which all data were available and corporation
boundaries remained the same between 1970 and 1976 were used in the
analysis. 290 of the 305 corporations in the State were included in
the analysis.
Massachusetts
The models estimated for Massachusetts are based on data collected
for the 1976-77 school year. The expenditure, state and federal aid,
and pupil data were obtained from published and unpublished reports
by the Massachusetts Department of Education. The measure of current
expenditures used in this analysis was "integrated operating costs"
which includes the total operating costs of schools and educational
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programs within the district.3 In addition, this measure includes the
district's contributions to regional schools and tuition paid for
placement of pupils in programs within other districts. In Massachusetts,
a town may belong to a regional district or make arrangements with
neighboring towns for education services. For example, a town may
operate its own elementary school,but rather than operating its own
high school, the town may belong to a regional high school. The town
would contribute its share of the operating costs of the regional school,
which is determined by the number of pupils who reside in the town,but
go to the regional school. The pupil data used for this analysis is
net average membership which includes pupils who reside in the town
and attend school operated within the town, regional schools, or programs
in other towns.4
Data on state and federal aid to Massachusetts' school districts
were obtained from unpublished reports provided by the Massachusetts
Department of Education. State aid was divided into two categories:
equalization aid (Chapter 70 aid) and categorical aid (total state aid -
school construction aid-.Chapter 70 aid). These federal and state
aid data only include the aid allocated for education programs within
the town. State and federal aid is also allocated to regional school
3In Massachusetts, school districts are coterminous with cities
and towns.
Integrated operating cost per pupil (net average membership) is
provided in Per Pupil Expenditures 1976-1977 published by the Massachusetts
Department of Education.
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districts. Because current expenditures included contributions to
regional districts, it was necessary to apportion state and federal
aid to regional districts back to member towns. Otherwise, state and
federal aid would be underestimated.
Aid to regional school districts may be divided into two categories:
regional school aid and regional categorical aid. Regional school aid
is state aid to regional school districts distributed by a formula
similar to the Chapter 70 formula.5 Regional school aid is considered
equalization aid. In order to apportion this regional equalization
aid back to member towns, the ratio of member town's contribution to
the regional district to the total contributions of all member towns
was calculated.6 This ratio was multiplied by the regional equalization
aid to determine the portion of that aid that should be added to the
member town's equalization aid. Similarly, this ratio was multiplied
by the state categorical aid to regional districts (total state aid to
the regional district - regional school aid - regional school construction
aid) to determine the portion that should be added to the member town's
state categorical aid.
Equalized property values and the residential share of the
assessed property tax base were obtained from 1976 Equalized Valuations
of Massachusetts Cities and Towns: Selected Tax Base Information,
5For a description of the regional school aid formula, see
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 71, Section 16D.
6Each regional district files a report with the Massachusetts
Department of Education stating the contribution of each member town to
operating expenses. These reports were examined in order to calculate
these ratios.
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published by the Massachusetts Department of Corporations and Taxation.
This publication provides a breakdown of the assessed tax base of
each city and town by ten property classes. Four residential classes
are reported: single dwelling unit, two dwelling units, three dwelling
units, and four or more dwelling units. Residential/commercial is
a fifth property class which refers to property where the first floor
has a commercial use while the upper floors are residential. Total
residential assessed valuation was calculated by summing the assessed
valuations of the four residential classes and one half the assessed
valuation of the residential/commercial class. Total residential
assessed valuation was divided by the total assessed valuation of the
town to obtain the residential share of the assessed property tax base.
Since school districts in Massachusetts are coterminous with
cities and towns, 1975 population estimates could be obtained from
Current Population Reports, published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.7
Median family income data were obtained from the fourth count of the
1970 Census of Population. Since fourth count census data were only
available for districts with enrollments greater than 300, median family
income data were not available for 93 cities and towns. As a result,
258 cities and towns were included in the Massachusetts sample used in
this analysis.
7U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1973 (Revised) and 1975 Population
Estimates and 1972 (Revised) and 1974 Per Capita Income Estimates for
Counties, Incorporated Places, and Selected Minor Civil Divisions in
Massachusetts," Current Population Reports (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1977).
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Michigan
The models estimated for Michigan are based on data collected
for the 1974-75 school year. There are 530 K-12 school districts in
Michigan. However, this analysis is based on a sample of 174 school
districts located in southeastern Michigan.8 Data on current expenditures,
state and federal aid, pupils, and equalized property values are provided
in Ranking of Michigan Public High School Districts by Selected Financial
Data 1974-75 published by the Michigan Department of Education. State
equalization aid was calculated using the formulae specified in the
Michigan legislation (see equations 3.6 and 3.9). State categorical
aid was calculated as total state aid minus state equalization aid.
The pupil count used in this analysis is total enrollment on the fourth
Friday after Labor Day. Equalized property values for each school
district are determined by the State Tax Commission and are specified to
be 50 percent of market value.
In the other five states included in this analysis, the residential
share of the assessed tax base was used as a measure of the tax burden
borne by the resident voters of the school district. However, in
Michigan, voters pay taxes on the state equalized value of their property
rather than the assessed value. Property is assessed locally and these
figures are submitted to a county tax commission which calculates an
equalized property value based on the assessments made in all districts
8The data for the 174 Michigan school districts used in this
analysis were assembled and provided by Professor William Neenen at
the University of Michigan.
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in the county. Finally, the State Tax Commission equalizes valuations
across counties. Taxes are based on this final state equalized value.
As a result, the residential share included in the Michigan models is
the residential share of the state equalized value of school districts.
Median family income and total population data were obtained
from the fourth count of the 1970 Census of Population.
Minnesota
The expenditure models estimated for Minnestoa were based on
data collected for the 1976 school year. Data on current expenditures,
state and federal aid, and pupils were obtained from the Minnesota
Department of Education. Data on the composition of the assessed
tax base were obtained from the Minnesota Department of Revenue. Total
equalized property values were estimated from assessment data and assess-
ment to sale ratios provided by the Department of Revenue.9
The median family income and total population data were obtained
from the fourth count of the 1970 Census of Population. These data
were available for 370 Minnesota school districts. The Minnesota sample
used in this analysis included these 370 districts.
9The data on current expenditures, state and federal aid,
pupils, residential share of assessed property tax base, and estimates
of total equalized property values were assembled and provided by
Phillip-E. Vincent and E. Kathleen Adams at the Education Finance
Center, Education Commission of the States. For a more detailed
description of this data, see Vincent and Adams, Fiscal Responses of
School Districts, pp. 39-40.
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New Jersey
The models estimated for New Jersey are based on data collected
for the 1977-78 school year.10 New Jersey has 343 school districts
which provide K-12 education. Data on current expenditures, state and
federal aid, pupils, and equalized property values were obtained from
the New Jersey Department of Education's school finance computer tapes.
Current expenditures include all expenditures except those for capital
outlay. The pupil count used in this analysis is total enrollment as
of September, 1977. The composition of the assessed property tax base
was obtained from municipal data published by the New Jersey Department
of Community Affairs.11 In New Jersey, school districts are coterminous
with municipalities. The municipal data provide two categories of
residential property: residential and apartments. These two categories
were combined to determine the residential share used in this analysis.
Since New Jersey school districts are coterminous with municipalities,
1975 population estimates are available in Current Population Reports,
published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.12 Data on median family
All data for -New Jersey school districts used in this analysis
were assembled and provi4ed by Professor Andrew Resdhbvsky of Tufts
University or Margaret E. Goertz of the Education Policy Research
Institute, Education Testing Service.
1 1Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the Division of Local Government
Services, 1974, Statements of Financial Condition of Counties and Munici-
palities, prepared by the State of New Jersey, Department of Community
Affairs, Division of Local Government Services.
12U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1973 (Revised) and 1975 Population
Estimates and 1972 (Revised) and 1974 Per Capita Income Estimates for
Counties, Incorporated Places, and Selected Minor Civil Divisions" in
Current Population Reports (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1977).
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income were obtained from the fourth count of the 1970 Census of
Population. These census data were not available for 56 New Jersey
districts which had enrollments of less than 300 in 1969. As a
result, the New Jersey sample for this analysis included 287 school
districts.
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